


# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



PROJECT REPORT ON RUSSIAN NAVY  
CIRCA 2000

EDITED BY  
JAMES JOHN TRITTEN

NOVEMBER 1992

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Prepared for: Chief of Naval Operations  
OP-922  
Washington, DC 20350

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

Rear Admiral Ralph W. West, Jr.  
Superintendent

Harrison Shull  
Provost

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
Monterey, California

NPS(NS/Tr)  
November 11, 1992

MEMORANDUM

From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)  
To: Captain Edward Smith, USN, Director, Intelligence Division,  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-922)

Subj: PROJECT REPORT

Ref: (a) "Intelligence Database Support for Naval Arms Control,"  
Masters Thesis by LTs Diego R. Corral & Richard H.  
Shirer, USN, December 1991  
(b) "Assessing the Impact of Reasonable Sufficiency on the  
Structure and Missions of the Former Soviet Navy,"  
Masters Thesis by LT Scott M. Stanley, USN, June 1992

Encl: (1) Course Outline for NS 4451, Spring Quarter, AY-92  
(2) Project Report for Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval  
Affairs

1. References (a) and (b) are Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses completed and delivered to your office prior to the commencement of work by me on my current research project for you, "The Navy in Evolving [former Soviet] Republic Military Strategies." Reference (a) was completed by two unrestricted line officers (surface and aviation) who are now naval intelligence subspecialists. Two additional students, a Navy intelligence officer and an Army Foreign Area Officer, are finishing up a joint thesis tentatively titled "Future Roles and Missions of the Russian Armed Forces," with an expected completion of December 1992. I am in the process of accepting two additional naval intelligence officers as thesis students who will be looking at Russian views of modern nonlinear warfare and strike reconnaissance complexes.

2. These theses support my own research efforts and demonstrate the strong interrelationship between student and faculty research at NPS. All of these existing thesis efforts have been thoroughly coordinated with your predecessor, Captain Tom Ellsworth, and I hope that they have been useful.

3. Captain Ellsworth and I also jointly oversaw another student research effort, one that involved a slightly different approach but with the same general emphasis. During the Spring Quarter of Academic Year 1992, I offered a graduate seminar in Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval Affairs (subsequently renamed Advanced Topics in Russian/Central Eurasian Naval Affairs). Since this seminar is only required for the intelligence curriculum, I modified its contents to satisfy the curriculum sponsor.



4. Specifically, Captain Ellsworth wanted the class to look at the emerging Russian Navy, circa 2000. We were to use only unclassified sources and we were to use a group research technique so that the students would experience this common method of performing research when in joint assignments. The option for group research was accepted by the vast majority of the students enrolled in the course. Captain Ellsworth himself spoke to the seminar when he visited us in April 1992. Enclosure (1) is a copy of the course outline for the seminar. You will note that it included the participation of Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, from the Russian Institute for World Economy and International Relations.

5. Enclosure (2) is the final project report, prepared by ten students and edited by myself. The student researchers included: two naval intelligence officers, one unrestricted line (aviation), and two general unrestricted line officers enrolled in the operational intelligence curriculum; one naval intelligence officer and one unrestricted line officer (submarines) enrolled in the naval intelligence (S&T) curriculum; one surface warfare officer (who switched to naval intelligence while at NPS) and one Army Foreign Area Officer enrolled in the Russian area studies curriculum; and one submarine officer enrolled in the antisubmarine warfare curriculum. Student opinions sought after the course indicate that they enjoyed the experience of the group project. Each of the participants learned firsthand about the strengths and weaknesses of group efforts such as this one.

6. As for the substance of the effort, I would welcome your comments, of course recognizing that the completion date of the work was early June 1992. If you would like to specify some area for consideration by the next class taking NS 4451, please contact me as soon as possible.

Associate Professor Jim Tritten  
Wednesday Root 204A 0810-1000  
Thursday Root 228 1310-1500

QIII AY-92  
Spring

Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval Affairs  
[Advanced Topics in Russian/Central Eurasian Naval Affairs]  
NS 4451 (4-0)  
FINAL VERSION

Existing Catalog Description: Advanced study and research in Soviet naval and maritime affairs. Topics typically include: decision-making processes, scenarios, warfare capabilities and support systems, missions, methodology, gaming, arms control, and U.S. Soviet naval interactions. PREREQUISITE: NS 3450, TOP SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE information.

New Recommended Catalog Description: Advanced study and research in emerging Russian/Central Eurasian naval and maritime affairs set into the context of contemporary political realities and a new international security environment. Topics typically include: politico-military decision-making processes, scenario building, revised military doctrines and strategies, new strategic missions, naval operational art, warfare capabilities and support systems, data bases and gaming, threat and net assessment, and arms control. PREREQUISITE: NS 3252, 3450, TOP SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE information.

Course Objectives: By the end of the course, the student will demonstrate that s/he comprehends and can apply her/his knowledge of Russian/Central Eurasian naval and maritime affairs by contrasting Russian/Central Eurasian and other nations'/alliances' military and maritime concepts, doctrine, and strategy in a detailed analysis of one aspect of naval/military affairs using primary source materials. The student will demonstrate his/her ability to analyze the new maritime threats facing the U.S. and our allies/coalition partners from the emerging political actors in the former Soviet Union.

Clearance Requirement: The course is basically conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level to facilitate the taking of notes; however, classified (up to SECRET) discussion is encouraged and will routinely take place. Students are encouraged to participate in classified classroom discussions. **Notes shall not be taken of any classified classroom discussion unless the student has an approved notebook for the safeguarding of classified material.** One session of the course will be conducted at the TS/SCI level for those students that have the appropriate clearances. Students should arrange to upgrade their clearances with the Special Security Officer prior to the date indicated for this session. Students can be read in and out on a temporary basis.

Substantive Course Requirements: Students are offered a choice of two types of projects for which they can earn a grade; an individual seminar paper or a collective group project. The two choices are outlined below:

- - - - -

Seminar Paper Option: The first choice is a written research paper which will be the primary tool used by the instructor to verify the students ability to apply her/his knowledge and to write on the subject material. The analysis should **not** be descriptive but rather an evaluation of the topic. Assume that the professor has researched the topic and does not need background material. If you must describe the background, do so in one (or two) paragraphs. The student should read anything that exists on this subject (in Russian or Western sources).

The seminar paper should be about the length of a chapter in a thesis. Full documentation is required where appropriate. Cover folders and bibliographies are not desired. The major point of the paper is to analyze one aspect of the subject material of this course that will demonstrate that the student meets the course objectives (see above). The paper should open with an introduction that outlines the subject to be examined and a roadmap of where the author intends taking the reader. Heading and subheadings should be used to break the paper into separate sections. If appropriate, a findings sections should be included at the end. A conclusions section should also be at the end in every case. Conclusions should include a concise statement of the author's main points, his analysis of the findings (if any), opinions, and recommendations for policy/programming.

Seminar papers are due by COB Friday, June 12. The seminar paper will be graded by the instructor and returned via the guard mail with a grade for the paper, a grade for the oral presentation, and an overall course grade.

Seminar Paper Oral Presentation: The oral presentation should take a maximum of 50 minutes. It should include a minimum of background material and methodology and a maximum of results of analysis/policy recommendations. Sufficient time should be built in to allow for questions and answers. Copies of a one-page outline of the presentation may be distributed and are encouraged. Viewgraphs or slides are discouraged unless they really aid the presenter in illustrating a point. The oral presentation should **not** take the form of a military briefing.

Significant weight is given to the oral presentation as incentive to deliver a product that can be revised prior to completion of the written seminar paper. The oral presentation is the only opportunity to obtain comments from the instructor on the written seminar paper that must eventually be completed.



The oral presentation will be subject to peer review. Peer review will consist of each student in the audience evaluating the presenter for content and for presentation technique. A one-page evaluation form will be prepared by the instructor. It will contain narrative comments and suggestions for improvements to content and style. The evaluation will be compiled and a subjective evaluation will be given by the instructor to the student in a one-on-one debriefing.

The instructor will give an allowance for the first day's oral presentations; i.e. it is expected that these will not be as polished as those presented later. If a presentation during the first day is on par with those presented later, it will be a plus.

Seminar Paper Topic Approval: The student will present a one-page proposal for research at the Wednesday, April 15th class. Topics will be presented by each student to the seminar, comments sought from all, and written feedback obtained from the instructor. If the topic was not approved as initially written, a revised proposal should be submitted by COB, Thursday, April 16. Approval of a revised proposal will be sent to the student via guard mail.

The approved proposal, as modified, will constitute a "contract" between the instructor and the student as to what is expected from the oral presentation and written seminar paper. The contract may be modified, in writing, by mutual consent.

Grades -- Seminar Paper Option: The final grade will be based upon a written seminar paper and oral presentation of the student's research. The general weight assigned to each of these specific areas is as follows:

Oral presentation of research	25%
Written seminar paper	75%
TOTAL	100%

Oral presentations are expected to be delivered on the scheduled date. Written seminar papers that are turned in late will be subject to a half grade penalty. At the completion of the course, grades will be submitted by the instructor. No additional work may be completed after the course to raise a grade.

-----

Collective Project Option: A major research paper written and presented orally on a collective basis. The research paper should be on some aspect of Russian/Central Eurasian programming strategic planning for nuclear and conventional naval force requirements circa 2000 as set into a set of politico-military and economic assumptions to be specified in the paper.

The collective written project should not only be future-oriented descriptive but also include an evaluation of the subject material. The instructor will work with the students during the project to ensure proper direction. All students must participate in some aspect of the written project.

The collective paper should be about the length of a few chapters in a thesis. Full documentation is required where appropriate. A bibliographies is desired. The major point of the paper is to analyze the project material and demonstrate that the student meets the course objectives (see above).

The paper should open with an introduction that outlines the subject to be examined and a roadmap of where the authors intend taking the reader. Assumptions driving the study should be clearly identified in the beginning. Heading and subheadings should be used to break the paper into separate major and minor sections. A findings and separate conclusions sections should be included at the end. Conclusions should include a concise statement of the author's main points, their analyses of the findings, opinions, and recommendations for U.S. policy/programming.

The collective project is due by COB Wednesday, June 17. The collective project will be graded by the instructor and available for discussion with the instructor after the end of the course. The paper may be written at any level of classification that the participants are cleared for. The paper will be published as an NPS Technical Report and distributed to offices in the Pentagon. I also hope to present, or have student participants present, the collective findings on the forthcoming trip to Russia and the Ukraine.

Collective Project Oral Presentation: An oral presentation of research results will be made twice giving the students ample opportunity to enhance the written product. Not all students need to participate in the collective project presentation -- that being a matter for the collective to decide.

The oral presentation should take the entire double period on the day scheduled. It should include background material, methodology, and results of analysis/policy recommendations. Sufficient time should be built in to allow for questions and answers. Copies of an outline of the presentation should be distributed. Viewgraphs or slides are encouraged if they aid the presentation.

Significant weight is given to the oral presentation as incentive to deliver a product that can be revised prior to completion of the written paper.

The oral presentation will be subject to peer review. Peer review will consist of each student in the audience evaluating

the presentation for content and technique. A one-page evaluation form will be prepared by the instructor. It will contain narrative comments and suggestions for improvements to content and style. The evaluation will be compiled and a subjective evaluation will be given by the instructor to the collective in a special debriefing.

Collective Paper Topic Approval: Students desiring to work on a collective project will present a two-page proposal for research at the Wednesday, April 15th class. The topic will be presented by the collective and the instructor will ensure that each student has a role to play in the project. Comments will be sought from all students in the seminar and written feedback will be obtained from the instructor. If the topic is not approved as initially written, a revised proposal should be submitted by COB, Thursday, April 16. Approval of a revised proposal will be sent to the collective group of student via guard mail.

The approved proposal, as modified, will constitute a "contract" between the instructor and the students as to what is expected from the oral presentation and written paper. The contract may be modified, in writing, by mutual consent.

Grade -- Collective Project Option: Based upon classroom presentations, written project, including peer evaluation. Peer evaluations will be used to give the instructor an appreciation of the participation of each student (as perceived by the other students) in the collective project. The general weight assigned to each of these specific areas is as follows:

Oral presentation of research	25%
Written seminar paper	75%
TOTAL	100%

Oral presentations are expected to be delivered on the scheduled date. If the written paper is turned in late, the collective group of students will be subjected to a half grade penalty. At the completion of the course, grades will be submitted by the instructor. No additional work may be completed after the course to raise a grade.

-----

Office Hours: Will be in Root Hall, Room 102, on Tuesday or Thursday. Appointments may be scheduled by contacting me during class or by calling me at x2143 (leave answering machine message if out), or leaving a written message in my mailbox in Root Hall near room 103C.



Texts provided by the instructor  
which may be kept by the student

Yelena Agapova interview with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, with additional questions by Fred Hiatt from the Washington Post, "Before You Form an Army You Should Know What it is For--Expert Andrey Kokoshin Believes," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, March 17, 1992, pp. 1,2 (FBIS-SOV-92-053, March 18, 1992, pp. 25-28).

Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia," Washington Post, February 20, 1992, p. 1.

"Ocean, Russia, Navy," Moscow News in English, No. 2, 12-19 January 1992, pp. 6-7 (JPRS-UMA-92-005, February 12, 1992 pp. 38-41).

Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, "The Navy: Problems of Reduction and Development," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 11, November 1991, pp. 3-12 (JPRS-UMA-92-003, January 29, 1992, pp. 54-60).

Konstantin E. Sorokin, "Naval Strategy in a Renewing Union," Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in Russian, No. 11, November 1991, pp. 37-50 (JPRS-UMA-92-001-L, March 16, 1992, pp. 24-32).

Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 6th Ed., July 1991, 189 pp.

G. M. Sturua, "A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military Perestroyka," Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in Russian, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 23-26 (JPRS-UMA-90-016, 11 July 1990, pp. 46-53).

Captain 2nd Rank V. Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Postwar Era," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 7, July 1989, pp. 22-28 (NIC-RSTP-113-89, pp. 31-39).

Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, "Prepare Yourself for Modern Warfare," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 3-8 (NIC-RSTP-107-89, pp. 1-8).

N.P. V'yunenkov, et. al., "Modern Scientific Methods of Substantiating Prospects for Naval Development," in The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment in Russian, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1988, pp. 43-89 (NIC translation pp. 35-72).

Petr F. Ablamonov, Admiral: Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov in Russian, Politizdat [published in the series "Heroes of the Soviet Motherland"], 1986, 112 pp (JPRS-UMA-87-016-L, November 12, 1987, 70 pp.).



R. van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-85," Naval Forces, No. VI/1986, pp. 18-34.

Admiral P. Navoytsev, "Regularities, Content and Characteristic Features of Modern Naval Operations," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 7, July 1986, pp. 18-23 (NIC-RSTP-076-86, pp. 16-24).

Rear Admiral B. Yashin, "The Terminology of U.S. Military Doctrine," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 67-72 (NIC-RSTP-071-86, pp. 67-76).

"Soviet Naval Exercises: 1960-1984," NATO Review (Reprints), (circa 1985), pp. 1-13.

Captain 1st Rank B. Maskeyev, "Some Views on the Theory of Naval Weaponry," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 4, April 1982, pp. 27-31 (NIC-RSTP-040-82, pp. 21-31).

Captain 1st Rank G.A. Ammon, et. al., The Soviet Navy in War and Peace, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980, 147 pp.

#### Texts on Reserve in the Library Reports Vault

Soviet Naval Strategy (U), NIE 11-15/84D (1984) (S-217-743).

Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Towards the 21st Century, (U), NIE 11-15/89 (1989) (S-243-986) - 6 copies available.

#### Project Topics

Collective Project: Russian [former Soviet] Republic Navies 2000

Diane Burgess - surface fleet, organization, and deployments

Amy Gambrill - surface fleet, organization, and deployments

Michael Greenwood - ballistic missile submarines

Brent Griffin - cruise missile submarines

Jim Jaworski - ground forces and coastal defense

Jim Lewis - budget, readiness, and training

Jim McIlmail - policy, doctrine, strategy

Bob Poor - budget, readiness, and training

Wade Schmidt - attack submarine fleet

Keith Wettschreck - naval aviation

#### Individual Projects

Mike Gannon - Cruise missile proliferation

Scott Stanley - Defense sufficiency

Class ScheduleWednesday, April 1 & Friday April 3: NO CLASSES

- most students on travel to San Diego for intelligence experience tour.

Wednesday, April 8: COURSE INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

- Instructor lead seminar discussion of recent events in Russia and other former Soviet republics since we all were together in NS 3450.
- Discussion of options for the conduct of course.
- Agreement on alternate dates for class meetings.

Thursday, April 9: PROJECT POSSIBILITIES

- Students meet with instructor and discuss initial thoughts about individual and group projects.
- Instructor pass out provided texts.
- Students without SCI/G clearances see the SSO to obtain one.

Wednesday, April 15: PROJECT PROPOSALS

- Students turn in to instructor initial draft proposal for research in class and make formal presentations to students and instructor of desired individual and group projects. Class evaluate proposals and make oral comments to student.
- Instructor to make initial comments on proposal in class to be returned to students at the end of class.
- Students prepare revised written version of project proposals to be turned in after next class.

Thursday, April 16: RUSSIAN NAVAL HISTORY/PROJECT PROPOSALS

- Videotape: Sergei M. Eisenstein (Director) *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) 70 min.
- Discussion of historical background to Russian Navy and the use of film in military and political science.
- Discussion, if required, of revised proposals.
- Students turn in revised written project proposals to instructor by COB.

Wednesday, April 22: THE FUTURE OF THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY

- Guest seminar with Captain Tom Ellsworth, USN, OP-922.

Thursday, April 23: THE FUTURE OF THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY

- Continued discussion of issues raised by Captain Ellsworth.

Wednesday, April 29: BACKGROUND TO RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING

- Videotape: Chris Donnelly *War and the Soviet Union: Background to Soviet Military Thinking* (1988) 45 min.
- Seminar discussion of cultural and geographic determinants of military strategy in Russia.

Thursday, April 30: THE RUSSIAN VIEW OF WAR

- Videotape: Chris Donnelly *War and the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of War* (1988) 45 min.

- Seminar discussion of philosophical determinants of military strategy in Russia.

Wednesday, May 6: STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES

- Videotape: Chris Donnelly War and the Soviet Union: The Current Structure of the Soviet Armed Forces (1988) 45 min.
- Seminar discussion of organizational determinants of military strategy in Russia.

Thursday, May 7: PROJECT REPORT SITREPS/SCI SESSION

- Each student, and the collective group, will make 5 minute presentation of research efforts to date.
- Peer review and seminar discussion of individual and collective efforts.
- A session will be held in the vault for those students who have the appropriate clearances.

Wednesday, May 13: RESEARCH PERIOD

- Instructor on travel.

Thursday, May 14: RESEARCH PERIOD

- Instructor on travel.

Wednesday, May 20: RESEARCH PERIOD

- Students meet with instructor in office if needed.

Thursday, May 21: GROUP PROJECT REPORT

- Initial presentation of collective project results.
- Collective group to meet with instructor for feedback.

Wednesday, May 27: GROUP PROJECT MEETING

- Discussion on how to improve presentation

Thursday, May 28: INDIVIDUAL PROJECT REPORTS

- Presentation of individual project reports.
  - #1 Mike Ganon
  - #2 Scott Stanley
- Students to meet with instructor next day for feedback.

Wednesday, June 3: RESEARCH PERIOD

- Students should revise and complete their written reports based upon comments received from instructor.

Thursday, June 4: RESEARCH PERIODEIOD

- Students should revise and complete their written reports based upon comments received from instructor.

Wednesday, June 10: GROUP PROJECT REPORT

- Final presentation of collective project results.
- Collective group to meet with instructor for feedback.

Thursday, June 11: RESEARCH OVERVIEW/SOFs

- Seminar discussion of what we have learned from research efforts in the course.

- Student opinion forms.

Friday, June 12: INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS DUE

- All individual written projects due by COB.

Wednesday, June 17: GROUP PROJECT DUE

- Collective group written project due by COB.

Friday, June 19: FUTURE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY

- Special guest seminar with Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), currently a guest scholar at the RAND Corporation.


cc: NS, NS/Gt, NS/Tk, NS/To

38, 381

OP-922



**Project Report for  
Advanced Topics in Soviet Naval Affairs  
NS 4451  
Professor Jim Tritten**



**RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES - 2000**

**Submitted by:**

**Diane Burgess  
Amy Gambrill  
Michael Greenwood  
Brent Griffin  
Jim Jaworski  
Jim Lewis  
Jim McIlmail  
Bob Poor  
Wade Schmidt  
Keith Wettschreck**



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## I. INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union has left serious questions for U.S. security planners as to the fate of former Soviet armed forces. The U.S. national security strategy has for the last fifty years dealt with the threat from the growing Soviet military machine. Now that the USSR has formally been dissolved, what are the implications for future US security planning? The CIS and the republics that have emerged from the late Union still possess strong forces that are not only in search of a mission but an identity as well. The former Soviet Navy has been of special concern to U.S. planners as one of the services capable of projecting power, by nuclear or conventional means, on a worldwide scale. The ability of the Navy to still fulfill its conventional and nuclear strategic missions is of great importance to the U.S. While it is true that President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the U.S. and U.K. are no longer the enemy <sup>1</sup>, it is still prudent for U.S. programming and war-planning purposes to study the evolution of the former Soviet Navy.

As the year 2000 approaches the former Soviet Navy will have evolved beyond the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form, that may or may not come into competition with the U.S. Navy. Therefore this study will explore one possible state of the former Soviet Navy in the year 2000, and come to some conclusions as to the implications for U.S. security planning.

To examine the former Soviet Navy in the year 2000 it is necessary to construct the force structure that the former Soviet Union is likely to have at that point. To understand how post-Soviet governmental decisions will be made on force structure it is also necessary to look at the political and economic realities of the post-Soviet era. The decisions as to that force structure depend upon the reduction/procurement cycles, defense policies, doctrines and strategies established by the governments that have succeeded the former Soviet Union. Determination of the defense policies, doctrines and strategies is also imperative in projecting the types of employment that the post-Soviet Navy may see at the turn of the century. This, of course, is the crux of the matter for the US Navy, i.e., who will it face, what will they have for forces and how will they employ them.

Once the basic national security philosophies of the post-Soviet governments have been established then the current order-of-battle can be adjusted for the years leading to 2000. Each sub-category of the Navy will be examined for developmental trends and formulation of the projected order-of-battle. Key assumptions will have to be made, as will be noted, to facilitate the study as the process of transformation in the post-Soviet states is ongoing. Implications for the US security planning arena will be drawn, thereby establishing the relevance of the study.

1. "BBC Airs Interview With Yeltsin" London, BBC Television Network, in English, 2230 GMT 29 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-020, 30 January 1992, p 21).

## II. POLITICS, POLICY AND DOCTRINE

### A. OVERVIEW

The political situation in the former Soviet Union plays a pivotal role in the formulation of defense policy and doctrine. The former Soviet Navy will be developed from the basic guidelines laid down by that policy and doctrine. The determination of an appropriate policy and doctrine is essential for the formulation of order-of-battle and employment projections.

### B. POLITICS

The USSR officially came to an end in December 1991. The follow-on organization proposed was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose system of independent states that would try to cooperate on economic and security issues. Even at the outset of the CIS it became readily apparent that the former Soviet military was going to be radically changed. Several former republics did not join the CIS and some that did were going to form their own military, despite the agreements on common strategic defense,<sup>1</sup> the most notable from the naval standpoint were of course Ukraine and the Baltics. The decision by the Baltics not to join called the future of the Baltic Fleet into serious question, while the insistence of Ukraine on receiving the Black Sea Fleet became the number one divisive issue for CIS security plans.<sup>2</sup> The inherent weaknesses of the CIS have become very pronounced and the number of states pursuing their own security arrangements has steadily grown,

to the point that the CIS military and the institution itself are in very real danger of collapse. This can be seen in the recent collective security agreement signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992, where the agreement was signed by only six of the original eleven members of the CIS.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, for the purposes of this study it will be assumed that the CIS will cease to function as the premier security organization in central Eurasia, and that the former Soviet Navy will be divided up among the former republics on a very unequal basis. The vast majority of the Navy and all of its weapons systems, including nuclear ones, will go to the Russian state.<sup>4</sup> The Black Sea Fleet will be divided between Russia and Ukraine on something on the order of an 80/20 percent split<sup>5</sup> with some small portion going to Georgia as well. The Caspian flotilla will be divided among several former republics as well.<sup>6</sup> The Northern Fleet and Pacific fleets will be 100 percent Russian and the Baltic fleet will cease to exist for all strategic intents and purposes.<sup>7</sup>

The political situation between the former republics will be a uneasy dichotomy of economic cooperation for necessity and fear of the rise of Russian imperialism. The forcefulness that Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk has shown in forming Ukraine's military and confronting Russia on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet<sup>8</sup> will only abate if internal problems develop within the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine, especially in the Crimea.<sup>9</sup> For now the nations will cooperate but negotiations over military matters will be protracted and difficult. The possibility of conflict between



the Russians and the Ukrainians exists but it is very small. Both sides have too much to lose from such an encounter, but nationalist fervor could overcome reason and precipitate a confrontation. The base-line for Russian-Ukrainian relations to the year 2000 will be assumed to be one of wary cooperation coupled with increasing nationalist sentiment not culminating in conflict but certainly precluding any sort of defensive alliance of note. Negotiations may succeed in the Russian Navy being allowed to use Sevastopol for basing rights for large cash payments but eventually, if relations do not warm, the Russians will need to construct a new base in the Black Sea.<sup>10</sup> The Russians will not abandon the Black Sea as it has a significant history of strategic value.<sup>11</sup>

The relationship with the other states will not be nearly as acute, with the possible exception of the Baltics and Azerbaijan. The lingering problems of troop withdrawals and economic reparations will leave very bad feelings on both sides and the Balts will do all in their power to limit the power of the Fleet in the Baltic.<sup>12</sup> It will be assumed that Kaliningrad will remain Russian and will contain some military and naval units but on a far smaller scale than before. The Balts may gain some small portion of coastal patrol boats for concessions in other areas.<sup>13</sup> The Caspian flotilla will be divided up but the political relations between Russia and Azerbaijan will probably deteriorate. The Russians may in fact strengthen their portion of the Flotilla if they feel threatened but this will not occur in the near term. All other states will have no direct say in Russian Naval affairs. The Navy will be assumed

in effect to be the Russian Navy alone.

The internal Russian political scene is of importance in this regard, with the Navy primarily under Russian control. The state of the Russian Federation will depend upon the success of the economic programs that Yeltsin has undertaken in 1992. The outlook for the economic reforms is poor at present mainly due to the political turmoil caused by the continued communist presence on the political scene and the depths of the economic problems. The requirement for Western aid will continually be less than needed and the prospect of little to no growth of the Russian economy at least until the year 2000 is very strong.<sup>14</sup> With this in mind the very real possibility exists of the rise of strongly autocratic and nationalistic rule in Russia, not of the extreme right but certainly not of a democratic model.<sup>15</sup> The implications of this will include a renewed sense of needs of defense of the homeland but not yet of imperialistic designs. While this may give rise to nervousness in the neighboring states it will not yet pose a serious problem for the US. In fact one of the more likely results of the continued economic problems and concentration upon internal problems will be much closer cooperation with the U.S., European Community and United Nations on defense and peacekeeping issues.<sup>16</sup> All of this bodes well for US naval concerns on the high seas.

### **C. MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE**

Military doctrine in the former Soviet Union proceeded from military policy and will continue to do so in the post-Soviet era.

While a new Russian doctrine has not been formulated as of yet, a new policy for Russia has been articulated. The military policy for the post-Soviet government of Russia will be the policy that most directly affects the Navy and it is therefore the one that will be dealt with for the remainder of the study. The new policy calls for the prevention of war, the primacy of defense of the homeland, a foreign policy that strengthens international stability, and a defensive policy that will not be perceived as threatening by any neighboring nations. All of this will lead to the possibility of real reductions in the military budget so that the revenue can then be directed to the formation of a market economy and addressing of social problems.<sup>17</sup> This will be the policy that will be assumed to be in effect in the year 2000 for the purposes of this study.

Military doctrine in the Soviet sense was defined as the set of views accepted in a country which governed the aims and character of possible war, preparation of the country and its armed forces for war, and the methods of waging war.<sup>18</sup> This doctrine was composed of two interdependent sides - socio-political and military-technical.<sup>19</sup> It is in these two areas that the debate in post-Soviet Russia, as to the new doctrine, will be waged. The military doctrine of the former Soviet Union was under deep review at the time of the Union's demise. The socio-political concepts of "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" had been foremost in the terms of review and change in the Doctrine.<sup>20</sup> That trend has continued in the post-Soviet era with these concepts becoming the standard in all articles on the subject.<sup>21</sup> The problem comes in when we try to determine the

exact meaning of these concepts.

In almost all articles by now "reasonable sufficiency" has come to mean the ability to ensure victory over an aggressor and the inviability of borders, and if war occurs the quick resolution and restoration of peace.<sup>22</sup> The Russian nuclear arsenal will be a strong deterrent of any massive invasion and the strong military of conventional forces will deter lesser contingencies or give the ability to successfully defeat the enemy. The "reasonable sufficiency" concept has taken on new meaning with the new military policy's emphasis upon cutbacks to jump-start the economy. The fact that the severe strain on future budgets will limit the needs and actual acquisitions of the military well into the next century cannot be escaped. This study will assume that this doctrine will continue to be in place for the year 2000.

The "defensive defense" concept will call for the ability to guard Russia's borders and do so without having to initiate an attack or attack into enemy territory outside of Russia. This does not mean absorbing the first blow however.<sup>23</sup> This raises a very specific question for the Navy as to the distance seaward that the defense will be extended. It will be assumed for the purpose of this study that the defense of the coastline will be extended to 300 kilometers from the coast.<sup>24</sup> Again this will be assumed to be the Doctrine in effect at the year 2000.

The military-technical side of the new Doctrine is also still under debate, probably even more so than the socio-political side. This side deals with the nature of the threat; the character of



future war; force development; and methods of armed conflict, training and preparations.<sup>25</sup> The new Doctrine will be assumed to state that no nation is viewed as the enemy.<sup>26</sup> The new Russian Deputy Defense Minister Andre Kokoshin has stated that the future of war is in the low to medium-intensity conflicts and that Russian forces should be developed with this in mind. He further states that the combined arms heavy tank formations are an anachronism and Russia should concentrate on high technology, mobility and professionalization of the armed forces. Overall military strength of the Russians will be 1.2-1.5 million men with a greatly increased emphasis upon smart weapons, air assets, airborne troops, amphibious warfare forces, rapid deployment forces with conscription decreasing and contract military personnel making up the better part of the forces, especially the Navy and Air Defense Forces. His comments on the Navy call for high technology coupled with downsizing, the importance of coastal defense, own-SLOC defense, as well as strategic missile carriers in bastions of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea.<sup>27</sup>

The Navy in the Soviet period did not have a separate strategy, and this will continue in the post-Soviet era.<sup>28</sup> The Navy must be studied from the doctrinal context to ascertain priorities of employment. With the doctrinal concepts already examined in mind, some assumptions can be made for the future of the Navy. It is assumed that bastion defense will remain at the top of the list of Naval priorities as will own-SLOC defense. Overseas actions outside of this maritime defense zone will not take place although out of

area deployments will occur for diplomatic, and peacekeeping missions.<sup>29</sup> These out of area deployments will not include SSBNs and most likely very small numbers of SSNs, ostensibly for training missions. Intelligence-gathering ships will deploy along the coastline and will probably tail any foreign naval vessels within the 300 km zone. Strategic ASW will be confined to bastions and close aboard areas for SSBN defense, not for non-Russian SSBN prosecution.

Naval aviation will be in support of all of these missions with primary usage probably coming in the 300 km zone for coastal defense. The carrier program will not be ended, but will cease at two units.<sup>30</sup>

Ukrainian Military Policy and Doctrine will be separate from the Russian versions. The Ukrainian policy states that Ukraine sees no country as its enemy, desires a nuclear free and block free status and that it has know territorial claims upon its neighbors.<sup>31</sup> The Doctrine calls for defense of the coastline with an emphasis on the economic protection and smuggling.<sup>32</sup> The possibility exists for the small Ukrainian Navy to conduct brief sorties into the Mediterranean for diplomatic and economic interests, but this has been denied by the Ukrainian Defense Minister.<sup>33</sup> The Russians will almost certainly remain active in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea but in small or even single ship groups and at very infrequent intervals.<sup>34</sup>

#### D. SUMMARY

The political situation in the former Soviet Union is the determining factor in the formulation of defense policy and doctrine. The Military Policy and Doctrine of the Russian State have been generally in line with the previous evolution of Soviet Policy and Doctrine. The major factor entering into the political decision process is the economy. With the relatively poor prospects for improvement in the economy to the year 2000 the military will deal with Policy and Doctrine that restricts it to purely defensive actions and limited resources. The implications for the US Navy are significant: the end of Soviet strategic ASW targeting US SSBN's; the absence of Russian naval units on the high seas; the continued importance of bastions for Russian SSBNs and the consequent lowering of rational for Seawolf and Centurion; the dismantling of the proposed Russian carrier program; and increased cooperation with the Russians on a wider range of security issues.

With this setting of the political and doctrinal issues presented along with the noted assumptions it is now time to turn to the budgetary situation and its impact upon training.

1. "Kiev Military District Subordinate to Leader", Moscow, Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2200 GMT 27 Dec 91, (FBIS-SOV-91-251, 31 December 1991, p 62)

2. Yuliya Khaytina "Grachev Addresses Black Sea, Withdrawal Issues" Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, in Russian, p 2, 20 May 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992, p 52)

3. The signing states were Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Byelarus may sign soon. Vadim Solovyev "Solovyev on Collective Security Decision" Moscow, Radio Moscow World Service, in English 1110 GMT 18 May 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992, p 32)



4. Russia has said that it will take control of all Commonwealth nuclear weapons and then hand them over to the CIS forces on the basis of interstate agreements. Roman Zadunayskiy "Fears of Transfers Groundless" Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, 1714 GMT 14 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-073, 15 April 1992, p 29).
5. Tatyana Malkina "Shaposhnikov Cited on Russia-Ukraine Talks" Moscow, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, in Russian, 29 Apr 92, p 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-083, 29 April 1992, p 9)
6. Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha "Further on Caspian Flotilla Protocol" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 18 Apr 92, p 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-078, 22 April 1992, p 10)
7. It has been stated by Russian media and military experts that the fleet will leave. Col. Victor Baranets "Potential Impact of Transfer of Baltic Fleet" Moscow, PRAVDA, in Russian, 12 Feb 92, p 6, (JPRS-UMA-92-007, 27 February 1992, p 35)
8. "Kravchuk Stresses Claim to Black Sea Fleet" Kiev, Radio Kiev, in English, 0100 30 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-022, 3 February 1992, p 61), "Kravchuk Demands Fleet Commander Resign" Moscow, INTERFAX, in English, 1050 GMT 31 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-021, 31 January 1992, p 60).
9. The Crimea situation has become especially acute with the vote for independence and the Russian Parliament's efforts to invalidate the transfer of Crimea by Khrushchev to Ukraine. Meetings are ongoing to resolve the problem. Several articles are of interest in FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992, p 36-42.
10. Yevgeniy Terekhov "Negotiator Cited on Black Sea Fleet Division" Moscow, INTERFAX, in English, 1624 GMT 4 May 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-087, 5 May 1992, p 7)
11. "Yeltsin, Commanders Address Officers Meeting 19 Jan" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 21 Jan 92, p 1-3, (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 Jan 1992, p 6).
12. A. Aleksandrov "Latvian Official Comments" Moscow, MORSKOY SBORNIK, in Russian, no.1 Jan 92, p 11-13, (JPRS-UMA-92-011, 1 April 1992, p 65, S. Bykhun "Lithuanian Official Comments" Moscow, MORSKOY SBORNIK, in Russian, no. 1, Jan 92, p 11-13, (JPRS-UMA-92-011, 1 April 1992, p 65-66, "Forces Blockade Roads Into Baltic Fleet Port" Moscow, Russian Television Network, in Russian, 1600 GMT 25 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-081, 27 April 1992, p 72).
13. "Claims to Parts of Fleet Prove Infectious" Moscow, TeleradioKompaniya Ostankino Television First Program, in Russian, 2100 GMT 24 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-018, 28 January 1992, p 16.



14. The seeming retrenchment from radical economic reform, the appointment of more conservatives to key positions and the confrontation with the anti-reform parliament continue today. Celestine Bohlen "Economic Furor Is Growing Over Changes by Yeltsin", The New York Times, vol. CXLI no. 48,986, June 3 1992, p A3.

15. M. Gorbachev has specifically warned against the economic crisis and the tilt toward authoritarianism by Yeltsin. Reuters "Gorbachev's Remarks Anger Russian Rulers", The New York Times, vol. CXLI no. 48,986, June 3 1992, p A3.

16. Some of this can be seen already with the deployment of the Russian battalion for UN peacekeeping in Yugoslavia. Anatoliy Kakovin "Battalion Bound for UN Postings in Yugoslavia" Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1815 GMT 18 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-076, 20 April 1992, p 19-20.

17. "Presidium Statement Released" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 15 Apr 92, p 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-075, 17 April 1992, p 46-47)

18. Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, (Coulson, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1990), p 106

19. For an explanation of the sides of Soviet Doctrine see Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scotts', The Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p 37

20. A draft Military Doctrine was prepared in 1991 but was not adopted as it was overtaken by the August 1991 putsch. For an in depth discussion of the changes occurring in Soviet Doctrine at the time see James J. Tritten's technical report entitled "America Promises to Come Back: Our New National Security Strategy", (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, NPS-NS-91-003C, October 23, 1991), p 49-63

21. "Volkogonov on Future Russian Army" Moscow, NEZAVISIMAYA Gazeta, in Russian, 12 Feb 92, p 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-030, 13 Feb 1992, p 47-48).

22. The excerpts shown are from articles dealing with the formulation of CIS doctrine but it would seem appropriate to extrapolate to the Russian Doctrine that it is no out yet. Rear Admiral L. Belyshev "Rear Admiral Belyshev: Moving Fleet into Market Economy" Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK, in Russian, no.1 Jan 92, p 3-10, (JPRS-UMA-92-014, 22 April 1992, p 12-18, Col. L. Klimenko "Draft Military Doctrine Accounting for National Changes" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 20 Dec 91, First Edition, p 2, (JPRS-UMA-92-009, 11 March 1992, p 57.

23. Klimenko, p 59.

24. While no definitive range of coastal defense has been offered in the literature the commander of the Russian Pacific Ocean Fleet has categorically stated that the Doctrine is defensive and coastal. Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin has also stated that the areas used for exercises has been restricted to seas adjoining the former USSR. It is reasonable to assume that the Navy will train as it will fight and that these areas are the ones deemed most critical to defense of the homeland. From this it has been assumed for the purposes of this study that for the coastal defense and bastion defense missions the figure of 300 km is plausible. Vladimir Palagativ "Naval Commander Disputes Charge of Weak Navy" Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1002 GMT 10 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-070, 10 April 1992, p 9, V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy" Moscow, MORSKOY SBORNIK, in Russian, no. 11, Nov 91, p 3-12, (JPRS-UMA-92=003, 29 January 1992, p 55.

25. United States Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1990, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p 23.

26. Klimenko, 57.

27. Yelena Agapova "Kokoshin Outlines Future Military Needs" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 717 Mar 92, p 1-2, (FBIS-SOV-92-053, 18 March 1992, p 25-28).

28. V. Chernavin, p 55.

29. The US has reportedly invited the Russian Navy to take part in the Red Sea patrols in support of the trade embargo on Iraq. "US Invites Navy to Join Red Sea Patrols" Moscow, INTERFAX, in English, 1118 GMT 21 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-078, 22 April 1992, p 20)

30. The aircraft carrier Ulyanovsk has already been slated for scrapping and the Varyag has had construction halted. Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin "Black Sea Ship Construction Deputy General Director Interviewed" Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in Russian, 21 Apr 92, First Edition p 2, (JPRS-UMA-92-015, 29 April 1992, p 10-11).

31. "Further on Statement" Kiev, Ukrayinsha Radio First Program Network, in Russian, 0900 GMT 1 Apr 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-064, 2 April 1992, p 67-68).

32. S. Sokolova "Pyankov Characterizes Results of Fleet Talks: Talks to End 17 Jan" Moscow, Russian Television Network, in Russian, 1200 GMT 15 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-011, 16 January 1992, p 13).

33. While the Defense Minister has denied any plans for forays into the Mediterranean the new head of the Ukrainian Navy says that he sees a need for such deployments. V.I. Antonov "Defense Chiefs Antonov, Morozov on Budget, Fleet" Kiev, NARODNAYA ARMIYA, in Russian, 15 Jan 92, p 1, (JPRS-UMA-92-004, 6 February 1992, p 51), "Navy Commander Cited on Black Sea Dispute" Moscow, Programma Radio Odin Network, in Russian, 1500 GMT 11 May 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-092, 12 May 1992, p 49).

34. N. Belav "Further Reportage on Black Sea Conflict" Moscow, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, in Russian, 9 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-006, 9 January 1992, p 8).

### III. THE BUDGET'S EFFECT ON TRAINING AND READINESS

#### A. OVERVIEW

If a fundamental thesis of military readiness is that a force "plays like it practices," then examining the levels of activity within the Russian navy may provide insight into its ability to accomplish assigned missions by the turn of the century. Traditionally, high levels of military training and readiness were not particularly controversial within the Soviet Union and its war economy; now, training and readiness appear to be constrained almost solely by the budget and economic realities of a nation in transition. In fact, according to Russian television, Dmitrii Volkogonov, a senior advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, recently called for a two-year transitional period during which defense reform could be carried out.<sup>1</sup> In the chaos of the current political and military situation in the former Soviet Union, it is of course difficult to predict the future. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that budgetary constraints will adversely affect the future training and readiness of the Russian navy.

#### B. THE OLD FACE OF THE SOVIET NAVY

Prior to the mid-1980s, military training and readiness were closely tied to doctrine. "The Soviet concept of 'combat readiness' (*boyegotovnost*) [was] to resist the temptation to deploy forces in peacetime precisely so that they [would] be available in the event of war."<sup>2</sup> To this end, the Soviet navy usually kept about 15



percent of its fleet at sea at any time, while 30 percent were capable of deploying at a moment's notice, another 30 percent within about 20 days, and the final 25 percent were in refit/overhaul.<sup>3</sup> So in other words, although Soviet ships conducted less at-sea training than their U.S. counterparts, the reasons for this were philosophical rather than practical.

Historically, trying to assess accurately the percentage of the Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defense has been notoriously difficult. "The most respected and reliable sources estimate that Soviet defence spending accounts for 15-17 percent of GNP."<sup>4</sup> On the high side, a number of Soviet dissidents, who included many of the hidden costs to the nation, argued that over 40 percent of Soviet GNP was spent on the military.<sup>5</sup> In any case, it is important to remember that spending and training were designed for a relatively high level of out-of-area deployments which supported a naval operational-strategic policy of "offensive defense" that included strategic defense, anti-SLOC operations, and a presence in the Third World. Even during the era of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, when Soviet naval training levels dropped off slightly, these reductions were still a function of doctrinal and operational-strategic needs, rather than economic realities.

### C. THE CHANGING FACE OF THE CIS/RUSSIAN NAVY

Whereas, historically, Soviet political/military policy justified the military budget, now the military budget must justify itself within the context of the changing political/economic

realities. As economic growth stagnated during the 1980s, former Soviet President Gorbachev attempted to exploit the "national investment in defence, and treat the defence sector as a reservoir of managerial talent and advanced technology which [could] be drawn on to revitalize the weak sector of the civilian economy."<sup>6</sup> Although this reform-within-the-system failed because more drastic measures were needed, interestingly it appears that a "brain drain" from the military to the civilian sector has begun to occur anyway.

In response to the current economic crisis, the Russian Parliament recently approved draconian budget cuts for the military. At the end of January 1992, officials said that the first quarter budget would total 420.5 Billion (B) rubles, of which about 50B would go to the military. That gives the military a 4.5 percent share of GNP<sup>7</sup>, far below the aforementioned estimates of previous levels. Two months later, speaking on Russian television, Russian Parliamentary Deputy Valerii Shinko said that the draft budget under consideration called for defense expenditures of 50.7B rubles for the first quarter of 1992, 118.8B in the second quarter, and an average of 132.6B for each of the last two quarters of 1992.<sup>8</sup> We presume these vastly higher amounts for future military spending in the draft will not survive the budgetary review process. Rather, the huge jump in defense spending after the first quarter suggests the military still has not fully come aboard with the fiscal austerity program.

Even so, the effects of the current budget crisis on the military are astonishing. For example, Russian television quoted

a *Washington Post* article that said "no Soviet surface warships are currently to be found anywhere in the world--not any, absolutely none!"<sup>9</sup> Additionally, TASS quoted a January 1992 Japanese media report that the Russian Pacific Fleet had sharply reduced activity, staying in port due to shortages of fuel and confusion in the management system of the armed forces. Vice Admiral Anatoliy Oleynik, First Deputy Pacific Fleet Commander, specifically refuted this report by saying, "I think that in a month or six weeks our colleagues from Japan will have work tracking our ships in the ocean by means of satellites and aircraft."<sup>10</sup> There has been no evidence of out-of-area activity by the Pacific Fleet following his statement.

Additionally, the Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered from major fuel shortages since late 1991. "The military--like everyone else--is desperately short of fuel. In order to maintain combat readiness while using as little fuel as possible ships are lying at anchor and have to all intents and purposes stopped carrying out maneuvers."<sup>11</sup>

Another example comes from an officer on board a Northern Fleet Typhoon-class ballistic-missile submarine:

Take a trivial example, for instance--the device for throwing waste containers overboard has broken. How do you get it fixed? You cannot afford to wait for civilian experts, and as for spare parts and tools--no, they do not get delivered to the boat. You manage as best you can. But you cannot go to sea with a fault like that.<sup>12</sup>

The percentage of spending on logistics and training within the already drastically reduced military budget has been significantly

cut. In essence, this slashing of the budget allotted for military hardware is being used to fund increased spending on personnel and services. According to ITAR-TASS, expenditures on military equipment are to be cut by 3.5 times in real terms (1991 expenditures were reported at 39.65B rubles and the 1992 budget assigns only 11.2B).<sup>13</sup> This figure matches the DIA assessment stated by its director, LTGEN James R. Clapper, Jr., in testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 22, 1992:

(Russia's military procurement) appears to have been cut by about 80% from the former republic's allotment for procurement in the same period last year.<sup>14</sup>

Concurrently, drastic measures are planned to offset the adverse effects of the country's economic woes on military personnel; a survey in the conservative paper, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, said that more than 300,000 servicemen's families were without permanent housing.<sup>15</sup> And President Yeltsin, in a recent speech to 5,000 military officers, promised that 60 percent of the new military budget would be used for housing and other social services.<sup>16</sup> In fact, reportedly "all capital investment in the military account will go to housing for officers, many of whom now live in abysmal conditions."<sup>17</sup> Although this is perhaps an overstatement, nonetheless it points out the changing priorities within the defense establishment.

Ultimately, as CIA Director Robert Gates recently testified, "Modernization programs are likely to be delayed or abandoned, and training will be cut back," causing the readiness of conventional forces in the former Soviet republics to be "at the lowest level in



many years," with naval deployments continuing to decline from already reduced numbers and the combat capability of general purpose forces deteriorating because of inadequate training.<sup>18</sup>

#### D. THE FUTURE FACE OF THE CIS/RUSSIAN NAVY

The future of the Russian navy apparently will be a function of an increasing percentage of funds for personnel and decreasing percentage for hardware and training. At the same time, the overall naval budget will likely remain low to ease the financial burden on the government and ease the changeover from a command economy to a free-market economy. As A.G. Arbatov, (then) head of the Department of Disarmament Problems of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, pointed out in April 1990 (to paraphrase), if you are going to make military cuts, it makes more sense to cut future acquisitions rather than current obligations.<sup>19</sup>

Debates on the future of the Russian or Commonwealth military structure continue, and the navy's role within that structure has not been resolved. The draft copy of *The Concept of Military Reform* (November 1990) probably *still* summarizes the military's desires,

In the Navy the force composition of personnel and equipment is to be maintained at a level of defense sufficiency comparable with the real threat to USSR interests. The combat capabilities of the fleets are to be increased under conditions of a further reduction in ship strength through their qualitative renewal, and command and control systems and equipment and all kinds of support are to be upgraded.<sup>20</sup>

The current civilian/legislative position is characterized by

the chairman of the Russian parliamentary budget commission, Aleksandr Pochinok, who, according to ITAR-TASS, on 6 May 1992 criticized President Yeltsin's (and the military's) defense spending plans. He suggested that President Yeltsin has been persuaded to continue funding for a number of high-cost military products, including the construction of more nuclear-powered submarines. But:

in the context of impending military manpower reductions and the difficulties faced by the Russian government in even meeting the payroll for troops currently in services, Pochinok asked where the government expected to find money to finance such weapons procurement.<sup>21</sup>

While it is unlikely that this debate will be resolved soon, some overall presumptions about the future direction of military forces, specifically training and readiness in the navy, may be made with a useful degree of accuracy. The degree to which the Russian economy can support future military expenditures while at the same time move toward a free-market system will have, as stated earlier, a major impact on doctrine (offensive defense has already been replaced by defensive defense). As General V. Lobov wrote, the military must "unequivocally demonstrate its purely defensive character, and, at the same time, be as economical as possible and be no burden for the country, which is in a difficult economic position."<sup>22</sup>

Additionally, the "difficult economic position" has had a drastic effect on military personnel. Even in an era of personnel cuts, the General Staff of the Commonwealth foresees manpower shortages when the Spring 1992 selection of conscripts begins.

According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda of 28 April 1992, "Only 28% of the total draft-age contingent is even available for service this year, and expected high rates of evasion will cut into the manpower pool even further."<sup>23</sup> While this will likely have a greater impact on ground forces, it will surely reduce the navy's capability to man ships with competent sailors. Political realities have also impacted on the officer corps of the navy. As one Northern Fleet officer commented:

Unprecedented changes are taking place in the Army and Navy today ... particularly in the officer's mentality. ... People are sick of everything. No one wants to have to wait and hope for politicians to agree. So it is resign and get the hell out of this service...<sup>24</sup>

Initiatives such as large pay raises for the military only partially offset the debilitating effects of the country's economic woes on military morale. Lack of housing, rapid inflation, and other problems in the civilian sector also reach the military. Paraphrasing Trotsky, the military feels all of society's ills, only at a hotter temperature. It is difficult to quantify morale and its role in training and readiness. Nonetheless, poor morale undoubtably decreases readiness as much as *esprit de corps* serves as a force multiplier.

Similarly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union directly affects the *institutions* of training in the navy. The question of who should control the Black Sea Fleet, where:

the overwhelming majority of officers--nuclear scientists and rocketeers--are trained...[has disrupted] the integrated organism of the Navy [and] will inevitably lead to an appreciable reduction in the level of combat readiness, will affect the reliability of guarding the sea lines of Russia, and will have a negative effect on the morale of the sailors.<sup>25</sup>

## E. SUMMARY

Estimating the cohesion of the Russian military and the status of the Russian economy by the year 2000 is virtually impossible. "Comparisons with past budgets are extremely difficult because of rapid inflation, because this represents Russia's first post-Soviet budget and because Soviet officials never released reliable budget figures, especially about the military."<sup>26</sup>

Out-of-area deployments have decreased nearly to nothing, as doctrinal needs have changed. As a result, the size and frequency of large-scale exercises have been significantly reduced. Now, whether current levels of training are appropriate has become a function of budget rather than mission. "The restructuring of this economic system to provide financial-economic administrative controls and its reorientation toward the urgent needs in improving the well-being of the people will hardly be effective without a radical reduction and restructuring of the military-industrial complex."<sup>27</sup> Therefore, due to the political and economic woes of the country, both training and readiness are, as LTGEN Clapper testified, "in profound decline."<sup>28</sup>

Assuming past calls by then President Gorbachev for a fifteen-year "grace period" for the transition from a planned economy to a free market were based on more than whim, then economic growth during the 1990s will at best be slight. While admittedly dated, a 1988 model of Soviet economic modernization may remain relevant. It projected a best-case/worst-case scenario for average annual growth rates; ultimately, in either case the average annual growth



between 1986 and 2000 was estimated to be 2.6 percent.<sup>29</sup> This, it must be remembered, was written in the context of an "orderly" transition to a decentralized economy, and did not foresee the complete demise of the USSR. Therefore, it seems realistic to opine that even an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent is extremely optimistic, and will more likely be closer to stagnancy, if not an actual decline. Additionally, as indicated in a 1987 Rand study, any growth in (then-Soviet) GNP most likely would have been dwarfed by a much higher growth rate in the West.<sup>30</sup>

The likelihood of the Russian economy's growing in real terms seems doubtful. Similarly, the military's percentage of the budget will "best case," from the Russian military's point of view, remain at 4.5 percent. This money will more likely be used to placate military personnel than to ready fleet units to fulfill their mission. That mission itself remains under discussion, further lowering fleet morale and readiness.

Thus, the overall outlook for training and readiness of the Russian navy in 2000 is cloudy. The return of a more conservative government could raise the priority of military spending. Additionally, improvement in economic growth could lead to more funds being available, even if funding remains at only 4.5 percent of GNP; rapid inflation and the transformation of the military-industrial complex, however, suggest the military's capability to fund programs will not increase. In any case, Russia's economic quandary points to a continued doctrine of defensive defense. Even this new doctrine, in the context of the current chaotic economy,

where simple training and readiness are not being fulfilled, seems a difficult goal to achieve.

#### F. A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION

Trying to draw an accurate conclusion from the aforementioned figures is like trying to complete the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel using a paint-by-numbers kit. However, as a means of estimating the effects of budget reductions we have broken military spending into five main categories:

- Research and Development of *future* systems
- Procurement of *new* systems
- Maintenance of *existing* systems
- OPTAR
- Personnel support: salaries, housing, etc...

These categories roughly correspond to the "four pillars of defense" used for budgetary planning purposes in the U.S. Department of Defense:

- Readiness
- Sustainability
- Modernization
- Force structure

For our example, we intentionally separated personnel from hardware in order to estimate the budget remaining for the four categories specifically related to hardware (categories 1 through

4). We have presumed that previous military spending was indeed approximately 16 percent of the GNP, and future spending will be about 4.5 percent. Additionally, we will presume that the GNP at the turn of the century will remain at approximately current levels. As previously mentioned, President Yeltsin stated that 60 percent of military spending will be for personnel (category 5), which is apparently a large increase. If we assume previous levels of spending on personnel were about 10 percent of the military budget, and the other 90 percent was dispersed between categories 1, 2, 3, and 4, then the following is true:

[Let M = total military budget and let G = total GNP]

#### Previous

$.10M \times .16G = .016G$  for personnel (i.e., 1.6 percent of GNP previously was spent on personnel)

$.90M \times .16G = .144G$  for hardware (i.e., 14.4 percent of GNP previously was spent on research and development of *future* systems, procurement of *new* systems, maintenance of *existing* systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR)).

#### Current and Future

$.60M \times .045G = .027G$  for personnel (nearly 3 percent of GNP will be spent on personnel, or nearly 1.7 times previous levels)

Therefore, the remaining forty percent of the (smaller) military budget must be split between research and development of *future* systems, procurement of *new* systems, maintenance of *existing* systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR):

.40M x .045G = .018G for hardware (less than 2 percent of GNP spent on hardware, about one-seventh of previous levels, which were 14.4% of GNP)

This level of one-seventh interestingly coincides with levels published in a recent *Washington Post* article, which reported that the Russian parliament approved a budget that contained one-seventh the level of spending for procurement.<sup>31</sup> If procurement levels are at one-seventh (14 percent) of previous levels, then spending on maintenance, research and development, and OPTAR probably will also be significantly reduced. While it may be foolish to suggest that readiness of the entire fleet is at 14 percent of the level estimated during the Soviet navy's heyday, it is safe to point out that current out-of-area deployments are at less than 14 percent of previous levels.

Of course, a more efficient use of existing resources as well as a reduction in unnecessary systems, which are expensive to maintain and equip, could skew upwards the readiness levels of the rest of the fleet. However, the previously stated anecdotal evidence suggests that "efficiency" and "management" of Russian naval assets are words that do not belong in the same sentence.

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#### IV. SUBMARINE FORCE

##### A. OVERVIEW

In the year 2000, the former-Soviet Union submarine ballistic missile (SSBN) force will be smaller, more survivable, and more accurate. Like its predecessor, it "...[will be] obliged to provide against the unleashing of nuclear war and the restraint of a potential enemy first and foremost...."<sup>1</sup> Consequently, because of its unique capabilities as a nuclear reserve force, Russia will not scrap its entire SSBN force. Rather, the navy's nuclear arsenal will be "radically reduced" in favor of ground-based strategic missiles.<sup>2</sup>

Unarguably, the former Soviet Union had the largest attack submarine force in the world. The U.S. Navy has spent vast amounts of money and used immense resources to counter the possibility of combating this formidable foe. But as with all other military branches of the ex-Communist state, this force was sustained by an extreme economic system. Now that the Soviet Union has broken into independent republics, the attack submarine force must set realistic priorities, goals, and missions based on the fiscal constraints of a free market society. The new missions and capabilities will probably have a major effect on the size and composition of the U.S. Navy. Pragmatically the resultant submarine force should be smaller in number and arguably less effective due to the scarcity of money for training and exercises. A rational approach for determining the attack submarine force of the former Soviet Union in the year 2000 must include determination of the missions, construction rates and

decommissioning rates applied to the current submarine force, and the political division of the fleets.

## **B. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES**

### **1. FLEETS AND BASES**

Presently, Russian SSBNs are deployed in two fleets: North Fleet (NORFLT) and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT).<sup>3</sup> In the North Fleet, there are four bases which currently support SSBNs on the Kola Peninsula. In the Pacific, bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk support the PACFLT SSBN forces.<sup>4</sup>

The NORFLT force consists of all six former-Soviet classes of SSBNs: Typhoon, Delta IV, Yankee I, Yankee II, Delta I/II, and Delta III. In contrast, the PACFLT has none of the newest classes, but is comprised of the Yankee I, Delta I/II and Delta III platforms.<sup>5</sup>

Looking ahead to the turn of the century, Russia will continue to divide the SSBN force between the NORFLT and PACFLT. Though it is more expensive to maintain two separate SSBN facilities, a balanced force is consistent with Russia's Soviet naval tradition. Consequently, Russia will realize the desired cost savings by reducing its operational SSBN bases to only one base per fleet; the remaining bases would then be used as temporary storage for nuclear submarines designated for disposal. The NORFLT force will be based at the Nerpichya facility; Nerpichya is the only base which has the infrastructure to support the Typhoon class submarine. Similarly, the PACFLT SSBN force will be homeported at Rybachiy; Rybachiy, unlike Pavlovskoye, has supported the most advanced



ballistic missile submarines in the PACFLT inventory.

## 2. ORDER-OF-BATTLE

The Russian ballistic missile submarine order of battle, hamstrung by economic constraints, will exist as a purely defensive-defense force.<sup>6</sup> Presently, the force consists of approximately fifty-nine ballistic missile submarines.<sup>7</sup> Of that total six are Typhoons, seven are Delta IVs and the remainder are the older less capable Delta I/II/IIIs and Yankee I/IIIs.<sup>8</sup> To date, the Typhoons and Delta IVs have only been assigned to the NORFLT. By the year 2000, budgetary pressures and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) requirements will slash the number of SSBNs. This force will consist of the Typhoons and Delta IVs. Though it is conceivable that the newer Delta III platforms could be retained until the year 2000, the Delta III's SS-N-18 missile system will be at seventeen years of service and the expense of maintaining the missile system may be prohibitive relative to the increased deterrent value.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, it is unlikely that the SSBN force will be augmented by the older classes.

Similarly, it is just as unlikely that new construction will increase the number of SSBNs; presently, there are no SSBNs under construction. In fact, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin's stated that "...New strategic missile carriers will ... not be built or put into service with the fleet in the next ten years."<sup>10</sup> Thus the heart of the submarine ballistic missile force will consist of the thirteen Typhoon and Delta IV units already in service.

The six Typhoons are armed with twenty SS-N-20 MOD 1 and MOD

2 missiles.<sup>11</sup> Depending on the MOD, the missile supports eight or ten MIRV's for a total of 960-1200 warheads.<sup>12</sup> The calculated equivalent megatonnage for the Typhoon class ranges from 206.8 to 258.5 EMT.<sup>13</sup> Lastly, all the Typhoons will remain in the NORFLT at the Nerpichya facility, which is the only base capable of supporting the class.

The Typhoon force will be complemented by seven Delta IV's. Though each Delta IV is capable of sixteen SS-N-23 missiles with ten MIRV's, the START Treaty limits each SS-N-23 to four RV's. Hence, the Delta IV's present 1120 warheads will drop to 448 total warheads.<sup>14</sup> This corresponds to 153.2 EMT for the class. Though presently homeported in the NORFLT, the Soviet Union's propensity for a balanced fleet should manifest itself in Russia's transfer of Delta IV's to the PACFLT; this is reasonable considering there is no existing infrastructure which would support fleet transfers of Typhoons to the Pacific,<sup>15</sup> and construction of such facilities would be beyond the ability of the Russian economy. Finally, the total equivalent megatonnage for the whole force is 360-411.7 EMT.

### 3. DEPLOYMENT

Deployment and operation of the Russian SSBN force will be driven by the goal of achieving sufficient deterrence at minimum cost:

A sufficient means of preventing world wars directed against Russia and CIS member states is provided by the strategic nuclear forces, whose composition should be regulated on a treaty basis taking into account the need to preserve those resources that best meet the requirements of nuclear safety and minimum cost.<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, Russia will utilize a mix of underway and inport units

on combat ("alert") patrol.<sup>17</sup> By employing the former-Soviet practice of utilizing inport units on combat patrol, Russia could significantly slash operational costs without sacrificing national security.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the use of in-port combat patrols have the added advantage of greatly simplifying the command and control of this strategic assets. Lastly, the in-port platforms can be maintained at optimum readiness and, with adequate warning, be sortied to provide maximum deterrent and second strike capability.

Despite the advantages of keeping the ballistic missile submarines inport, their susceptibility to a first strike will deter the Russians from keeping all SSBNs on in-port combat patrol. Historically, the Soviets have maintained 80% of their SSBN force in port.<sup>19</sup> Though it appears "unwise" for Russia to keep 10 of its 13 units in port, they are incapable of maintaining more SSBNs at sea. Consequently, they must rely on a cheaper alternative: obtaining adequate warning time to sortie the inport SSBN units.<sup>20</sup>

Hence, three of the thirteen SSBNs will be at sea at any time. The remainder will be in various stages of inport combat patrol, preparing for underway combat patrol, in transit to or from combat patrol, or in overhaul. Optimally, this results in a maximum of 86.9-108 EMT deployed at any time. Considering the goal is sufficient deterrence at minimum cost, this EMT appears to be adequate.

Finally, rather than deploying to open ocean, these submarines will patrol submarine coastal sanctuaries, i.e. bastions, in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.<sup>21</sup> In doing so, these

critical units are afforded the maximum amount of protection by submerged, surfaced and land-based assets. Yet, even if Russia cedes the Kurile Islands, the dual bastion concept will remain; thus, maintaining Russian naval balance and enhancing second strike survivability.

#### 4. IMPACT OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

Of the many factors affecting the Russian ballistic program, the most compelling external force is the START Treaty. This treaty's requirements will slash the number of SLBM's. For Russia, the START limits mandate a 41% reduction in all ballistic missile warheads, nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles, and heavy bombers; a 36.5% decrease in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles's; and a 47.9% reduction in ICBM and SLBM warheads. Concurrently, START authorizes a 66.7% increase in Russian land-based mobile ICBM's.<sup>22</sup>

According to the military doctrine, which is still being drafted, preference will be given to ground-based strategic nuclear forces that are less expensive and easier to control internationally. The navy's nuclear missile arsenal will be radically reduced.<sup>23</sup>

Considering the overall shortcomings of Russian SLBM systems, e.g. complicated C<sup>2</sup>, expense, and poor SSKP<sup>24</sup>, and Russia's desire for maintaining a second strike capability, dismantling the older and less capable ballistic missile platforms is the best means of achieving this end.

#### 5. RECONSTITUTION

Though the excess submarines will eventually be scrapped,



this will not occur anytime soon. The pace of SSBN, and other nuclear vessel dismantlings will be driven by the availability of facilities to remove and process missiles, nuclear propulsion equipment, and other hazardous materials.<sup>25</sup> In the mean time, SSBN hulls may be stored along piers of unused naval bases. Yet, despite the availability of excess SSBNs, the preservation required to maintain a nuclear submarine is prohibitive to reconstitution and counter-productive to the goal of decreasing costs. Hence, reconstitution is highly doubtful.

## **C. ATTACK SUBMARINES**

### **1. MISSIONS**

Admiral Chernavin has stated that the chief missions of the Russian Navy is to deter war, to defend Russian interests in time of conflicts, and to help restore the peace.<sup>26</sup> In the same article, ADM Chernavin stated the general purpose forces, including the attack submarine force, must be capable of performing three major missions while operating in conjunction with the other Russian military organizations: protection of the strategic nuclear systems, defense of Russian interests and territory, and protection of the sea lines of communication. These missions require a submarine force with a variety of capabilities. A review of each mission and its requirements is necessary to help develop a projection of the attack submarine force eight years into the future.

#### **a. *Protection of the Ballistic Missile Submarines***

There is no doubt that the primary mission of the attack

submarine force will continue to be the defense of the ballistic missile submarines. This mission is carried out in two ways, patrolling of bastion entrances and conducting "pro-SSBN" operations. The patrolling of the bastion accesses requires submarines which can stay on station for several weeks in shallow areas and have the ability to detect and destroy opposing surface ships and submarines. These submarines could be either nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) or diesel powered submarines (SSs). While the SSN is obviously better suited to maintaining its covert condition, the diesel is able to perform the mission at a significantly cheaper procurement, maintenance, and personnel cost. The pro-SSBN deployments require submarines capable of sustained operations with the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. This operation while capable of being performed by either an SS or SSN is a role best filled by an SSN due to its ability to maintain high speeds and sustained submerged operations. In the event of war with Russia, the U.S. Navy will still have a formidable task in attacking the strategic missile submarines.

Even under conditions of a great reduction in the Navy, in the "bastions" it would be possible to achieve a high concentration of all available and mutually reinforcing assets including diesel submarines and land-based aircraft with a limited radius of action, as well as to make active use of mine ordnance.<sup>27</sup>

The implications for the U.S. submarine force are obvious; quiet, nuclear submarines are still needed in the event of war with Russia.

#### ***b. Defense of Russian Interests and Territory***

The defense of Russian interests out to 300 km requires an attack submarine force which is capable of conducting ASW and

ASUW blue water operations. The submarines must be sophisticated and quiet, while maintaining enough firepower to stop an opposing naval force from approaching the Russian coastline. The attack submarines must be able to maintain station up to 300 km from the coast for extended periods of time while awaiting the approach of the enemy naval forces. The farther out from shore and away from friendly aircraft protection the submarines must patrol, the more advantageous the SSN becomes relative to the SS. The "indiscretion rate" of the SS becomes an achilles heel and exposes the submarine to attack from opposing anti-submarine aircraft and surface ships. The U.S. submarine force could deploy into this 300 km coastal defense zone and launch strikes with TOMAHAWKS. The remaining U.S. forces will be required to stand-off out of range of most of these forces, or ensure that the threat is reduced or eliminated.

***c. Protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)***

The same basic capabilities described in the defense of the coastline are required for the protection of the SLOCs. Most Russian merchant ships in time of possible conflict will probably maintain tracks close to the coast of Russia and its neighbors, thereby favoring the use of Russian diesel submarines to protect them from attacks by other submarine forces. The major implication for the U.S. Navy is that only fast attack nuclear submarines have the ability to threaten the Russian SLOCs.

**2. THE ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE NUMBERS**

Several recent articles by top Russian Naval Officers have stated that the Russian general-purpose submarine force consists of

"163 attack submarines, including 88 nuclear-powered ones."<sup>28</sup> While there are no clear distinctions how many of each class of submarine are included in these numbers, some basic assumptions can be made which probably give a fairly accurate Order Of Battle (OOB). The 163 must include both attack and cruise missile submarines. That number must also include the modern and recently built submarine, i.e. 7 AKULAs, 3 SIERRAs, 26 VICTOR IIIs, 7 VICTOR IIs, 15 VICTOR Is, 17 KILOs, 18 TANGOs, 6 CHARLIE IIs, 10 CHARLIE Is, 6 OSCAR IIs, and 2 OSCAR Is. These numbers give totals of 83 nuclear powered submarines and 35 diesel boats. The 6 missing nuclear boats probably are 2 YANKEE NOTCHs, 1 YANKEE SSGN, and 4 ECHO IIs, and the 40 missing diesel boats are probably divided between the JULIETT and FOXTROT classes.

**a. Construction and Conversion**

Due to very limited fiscal resources, the construction of most attack submarines will probably be delayed or cancelled. According to Jane's Fighting Ships, there are 6 AKULA SSNs, 3 SIERRA II SSNs, and 5 KILO SSs in various stages of construction. These submarines will probably be completed. The financial constraints under which Russia will be operating will almost guarantee that there will be no funding for further nuclear submarine construction, but with the possibility of maintaining the construction of the less expensive diesel submarines supported by the selling of every other unit to a foreign government. This could cause an increase in the number of KILO submarines available to the rest of the world. Also due to the limited financial resources, all conversions will stop



and no further units will be converted from one type of submarine to another, i.e. SSBN to SSN.

***b. Decommissionings***

There is very little available information covering the actual or planned decommissioning of ex-Soviet submarines. The shortage of information could be for security reasons, but a more likely reason is that no one actually knows how Russia is going to remove the submarines from the operational force.

(1) Diesel Submarine Scrapping. Russia has stated that many of the older submarines are being removed from service. The decommissioning and dismantling/scrapping of the diesel submarines is fairly easy. The submarines can be sold to numerous foreign scrapping yards in Spain, India, or a number of other countries. Although the possibility exists for Russia to sell the operational boats to Third World nations desiring to develop submarine forces, these boats are in varying states of disrepair and they are mostly obsolete.

(2) Nuclear Submarine Scrapping. The scrapping of nuclear submarines is another problem entirely. The Russians will probably run into the same problem as the United States, that is there is only a limited number of shipyards capable of properly handling nuclear fuel and these are needed to repair and maintain the operational submarines. To sacrifice pier and drydock space in these few shipyards to eliminate a deteriorating and antiquated NOVEMBER Class SSN rather than performing maintenance on a front line AKULA SSN does not make sense to an operational naval

commander. The only option left is to tie the nuclear submarines to a pier in a submarine base until a nuclear scrapping yard is built or the lack of maintenance on the operational boats allows time and space for the scrapping of a nuclear submarine. While awaiting to be scrapped, which could take a few years or a few decades, the submarines could be considered "reconstitution forces". Taking into account condition and obsolescence of the submarines which will probably be decommissioned (VICTOR Is, VICTOR IIs, WHISKEYs, and YANKEEs), the threat to the U.S. Navy is almost insignificant if these submarines are reconstituted. The ability of Russia to reconstitute these submarines is extremely skeptical.

### 3. THE CHANGES TO THE FLEETS

The submarine force will not suffer the drastic partitioning that the other components of the ex-Soviet military are undergoing. Russia will undoubtedly retain control of all the nuclear-powered fast attack submarines. This is due mainly to the costly expense and extensive infrastructure required to build and maintain these submarines. The Ukraine will take control of at least 3 diesel submarines and possibly as many as 5. Although these could be new KILOs, Russia is likely only to release the older FOXTROTs or maybe TANGOs. Russia will retain a fleet of about 5 to 8 diesel submarines in the Black Sea. These will probably be a combination of KILOs for coastal defense and TANGOs for extended patrols in the Mediterranean. The Baltic Fleet will maintain 5 diesels at St. Petersburg. These will likely be the smaller KILOs due to the shallow depths encountered in the Baltic Sea. The Northern Fleet

will remain the primary fleet (with about 60% of the submarines). All of the SIERRAs will be based at the Northern Fleet bases along with some of the AKULAs, VICTOR IIIs, and KILOs. The Pacific Fleet will remain secondary (with about 40%). These will be entirely AKULAs, VICTOR IIIs, and KILOs.

#### 4. OPERATIONS

The pace of coastal patrols will probably not decrease considerably. These patrols are needed to maintain crew proficiency and a credible conventional deterrent. The major change in operations will come from the elimination of routine Out-Of-Area (OOA) patrols. These are very costly and inconsistent with the new defensive-defense policy. In times of crisis, the Russian Navy could possibly send one or two attack submarines to the region for a short period of time. Russia will likely retain the ability to deploy world wide to protect their interests.<sup>29</sup> If there is a friendly naval base nearby, the Russians could maintain a continuous patrol of a crisis region using only two or three submarines. Of course more submarines would be needed for remote locations. To protect the SSBNs, the SSNs and SSs will continue the pro-SSBN patrols which were so common during the Cold War. These patrols are needed to ensure the continued deterrent value of the SSBNs by verifying that there are no unfriendly submarines following the SSBNs. In conjunction with the pro-SSBN patrols, the attack submarine force will maintain the patrols of bastion accesses to confirm that the bastions are free of non-Russian submarines and

allow the SSBNs to patrol unhindered.



PROJECTED RUSSIAN ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE - 2000

NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

<u>NO.</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>YEAR BUILT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>YEAR BUILT</u>
1	AKULA	1984	1	VICTOR III	1978
2	AKULA	1985	2	VICTOR III	1979
3	AKULA	1986	3	VICTOR III	1979
4	AKULA	1987	4	VICTOR III	1979
5	AKULA	1988	5	VICTOR III	1980
6	AKULA	1989	6	VICTOR III	1980
7	AKULA	1991	7	VICTOR III	1980
8	AKULA	1993*	8	VICTOR III	1981
9	AKULA	1995*	9	VICTOR III	1981
10	AKULA	1997*	10	VICTOR III	1981
11	AKULA	1998*	11	VICTOR III	1982
			12	VICTOR III	1982
			13	VICTOR III	1982
1	SIERRA I	1984	14	VICTOR III	1983
2	SIERRA I	1987	15	VICTOR III	1983
3	SIERRA II	1990	16	VICTOR III	1983
4	*SIERRA II	1993*	17	VICTOR III	1984
5	*SIERRA II	1996*	18	VICTOR III	1984
			19	VICTOR III	1984
2	VICTOR II	1973**	20	VICTOR III	1985
3	VICTOR II	1974**	21	VICTOR III	1986
4	VICTOR II	1975**	22	VICTOR III	1987
5	VICTOR II	1976**	23	VICTOR III	1988
6	VICTOR II	1977**	24	VICTOR III	1989
7	VICTOR II	1978**	25	VICTOR III	1990
			26	VICTOR III	1991

DIESEL SUBMARINES

<u>NO.</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>YEAR BUILT</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>YEAR BUILT</u>
1	KILO	1979	1	TANGO	1973
2	KILO	1981	2	TANGO	1974
3	KILO	1983	3	TANGO	1975
4	KILO	1984	4	TANGO	1975
5	KILO	1984	5	TANGO	1976
6	KILO	1985	6	TANGO	1976
7	KILO	1985	7	TANGO	1977
8	KILO	1986	8	TANGO	1977
9	KILO	1987	9	TANGO	1978
10	KILO	1987	10	TANGO	1978
11	KILO	1988	11	TANGO	1979
12	KILO	1988	12	TANGO	1979
13	KILO	1989	13	TANGO	1980
14	KILO	1989	14	TANGO	1980
15	KILO	1990	15	TANGO	1981
16	KILO	1990	16	TANGO	1981
17	KILO	1991	17	TANGO	1982
18	KILO	1992	18	TANGO	1982
19	KILO	1992*			
20	KILO	1993*+			
21	KILO	1993*			
22	KILO	1994*			
23	KILO	1995*			
24	KILO	1995*			
25	KILO	1996*			
26	KILO	1997*			
27	KILO	1997*			
28	KILO	1998*			
29	KILO	1999*			
30	KILO	1999*			
31	KILO	2000*			

\* Projected Construction

\*\* Possibly decommissioned instead of being refueled

**D. CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES**

**1. Missions**

The missions of Russian general purpose submarines, including nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), are directly related to overall Navy missions. This study assumes the Russian

Navy's primary missions in 2000 will include: (1) defense of the homeland; (2) protection of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); and (3) defense of Russian sea lines of communication (SLOC). Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin described these missions in November 1991:

The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to start and wage operations.... In the event of aggression our general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective performance of defensive operations in the continental theaters of military operations in conjunction with the other branches of the armed forces.<sup>30</sup>

The Russian SSGN force will play an integral role in these naval missions.

Defense of the homeland will remain an important role for general purpose submarines. SSGNs will focus on defending Russian territory from sea-based offensive threats, including U.S. carrier battle groups (CVBGs), amphibious readiness groups (ARGs), sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)-carrying platforms, and submarines.<sup>31</sup> This study assumes a 300 kilometer military defensive zone around the Russian periphery. Potential adversaries within this zone are subject to measured defensive reactions. The SSGN force also will participate in SSBN protection and SLOC defense. General purpose submarines, along with naval air and surface assets, will continue to provide a "defense in-depth" for Russian SSBNs operating in strategic bastions. "Strategic stability" for SSBNs will remain the

highest priority naval mission. Russian SSGNs also will be tasked to defend strategic SLOC during hostilities. This study assumes SLOC interdiction will not be a primary naval mission in 2000 and, therefore, will not be addressed.

The SSGN force will remain militarily important despite a projected decrease in U.S. CVBGs and amphibious readiness groups by 2000. The growing threat posed by new and additional SLCM-carrying platforms coupled with the decreasing capabilities of older Russian SSGNs will justify continued, albeit reduced, production of modern SSGNs.<sup>32</sup> Admiral Chernavin emphasized the importance of submarines while discussing general purpose forces: "... we feel that priority in their [general purpose forces] development should be assigned to the submarine forces, comprising the foundation of the strike potential of the fleet and a universal branch of the services able to fight any naval enemy effectively."<sup>33</sup> The Russian SSGN force, however, will undergo a dramatic numerical reduction this decade despite its continued military importance.

## **2. Order-of-Battle**

The current Russian SSGN and SSG (conventionally-powered cruise missile submarine) order-of-battle (OOB) reflects an aging, yet still formidable force:

PLATFORM	1992 OOB	YEARS COMMISSIONED
Oscar I SSGNs	2	1980-1983
Oscar II SSGNs	7	1983-present
Charlie I SSGNs	9	1968-1972
Charlie II SSGNs	6	1973-1982
Echo II SSGNs	3	1960-1967
Mod-Echo II SSGNs	15	1960-1967
Juliett SSGs	15	1961-1963 <sup>34</sup>
Total	57	

The majority of these units face block obsolescence and are being decommissioned after 25 years of service.<sup>35</sup> This study assumes all Charlie I SSGNs, Echo and Mod-Echo II SSGNs, and Juliett SSGs will be out-of-service by 2000. Older Charlie II SSGNs also will be decommissioned.<sup>36</sup> This represents a potential reduction of 44 SSGNs/SSGs by 2000. These units, which may remain pierside awaiting disposal, will not be reconstitutable. Additionally, the construction rate for Oscar II SSGNs--the only SSGN currently being produced--is slowing.<sup>37</sup> The Soviets had produced one Oscar I or II approximately every 1.3 years (i.e., nine units between 1980 and 1991). This study arbitrarily assumes that the rate will decrease to approximately one Oscar every 2.6 years. Three additional units, therefore, may be launched by 2000. The projected SSGN OOB becomes:



#### **PLATFORM 2000 OOB**

Oscar I SSGNs	2
Oscar II SSGNs	10
Charlie II SSGNs	4
Total	16

### **3. SSGN Disposition**

Russia will be the only former Soviet republic to have SSGNs. SSGNs will remain exclusively in the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets. This study assumes the Northern Fleet will retain approximately 55 percent of SSGN assets. The SSGN disposition by 2000 is projected to be:

<b>FLEET</b>	<b>OOB</b>
Northern Fleet	9 Oscar/Charlie SSGNs
Pacific Fleet	7 Oscar/Charlie SSGNs

Oscar II SSGNs, which are constructed at Severodvinsk in the Northern Fleet, must conduct future transfers to the Pacific Fleet to achieve this disposition.<sup>38</sup>

### **4. Nature of SSGN Operations**

Russian SSGNs, like the other general purpose forces, will continue to experience a lower operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Naval OPTEMPO, defined as the total number of days a unit spends at sea relative to the time it is available to go to sea, has declined since the late-1980s due to resource constraints.<sup>39</sup> Manifestations of reduced OPTEMPO include a decrease in exercise frequency and scope, along with a reduction in out-of-area deployments. Military

exercises have been defensively-oriented since the 1987 announcement of the new defensive doctrine. Large-scale exercises were still conducted in the late-1980s; however, recent exercises have been scale-downed.<sup>40</sup> Rear Admiral Sheafer, USN, the Director of Naval Intelligence, stated in February 1992:

Poor economic conditions have led the [Russian] navy to reduce further the scale of major exercises since 1989. Last year was the first year the navy did not participate in any large-scale, fleet-wide exercises. Instead, it started training with smaller-scale, shorter-duration exercises that were coordinated with other services and that focused on one or two warfare missions.<sup>41</sup>

Out-of-area deployments to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and other regions also have been dramatically reduced or eliminated. Rear Admiral Sheafer stated "... by the end of the year [1991] the only combatant deployed outside CIS local waters was a guided missile patrol boat stationed at Cam Ranh Bay."<sup>42</sup>

These general trends, caused by economic constraints, will continue into the next century. General purpose units will operate at OPTEMPO levels designed to maintain minimum tactical proficiency while reducing operations and maintenance costs. Exercise participation also will be reduced, however, the role of SSGNs will remain important. Rear Admiral Sheafer stated:

The 1991 navy exercises, although severely limited, continued to reflect the military's concerns about Western advantages in sea-based tactical aviation, land-attack cruise missiles, and forward-deployed attack submarines. Military planners obviously still considered it important to conduct exercises depicting the most dangerous threat (a no-warning or short-warning scenario from forward-deployed Western naval forces), even though Soviet political leaders (and the leaders of the Soviet Union's evolving successor states) probably viewed such scenarios as less likely than in the past.<sup>43</sup>

SSGN out-of-area deployments will be infrequent, if conducted at

all. The future of Russian SSGN operations will reflect a force focused on defensive operations in contiguous waters.

#### **5. SSGN Exports to Foreign Countries**

Older SSGs and SSGNs (e.g., Julietts and Echo IIs) may be exported to various countries for scrapping; however, it is unlikely they will be exported for military purposes. The units are considered militarily obsolete and dangerous to operate, posing a significant safety hazard for potential buyers. Third World countries, however, may express interest in newer Charlie I or II SSGNs. India, for example, leased a Charlie I SSGN from 1988 through early-1991. The Charlie reportedly was exported without missiles.<sup>44</sup> India also reportedly experienced various operational difficulties with the SSGN, including power plant trouble.<sup>45</sup> The adverse impact of this experience on other Third World clients is unknown.

This study assumes other nations, for various political and military reasons, may seek to purchase Charlie I and/or IIs. This study also assumes Russia will not export Oscar I or II SSGNs. The Russian Navy, in view of the projected reductions in the overall SSGN order-of-battle by 2000, cannot militarily afford to export Oscars--they need all of them to maintain a reasonable defensive capability. Oscar SSGNs also are the largest, most complex SSGNs in the world. Third World countries likely could not afford nor adequately support them. Overall, future SSGN exports will largely consist of units destined for scrapping. Military exports, while possible, will be minimal and will not include the modern, capable Oscar SSGNs.

#### **E. SUMMARY**

As a result of the changes in the Russian SSBN force the United States' security implications can be summarized as:

- The United States can significantly decrease its strategic deterrent force.
- The demise of the former-Soviet strategic offensive threat allows the United States to refocus its security interest towards regional conflicts and threats.
- The United States is justified in decreasing its number of SSN's. However, the final number and type of SSN must be capable of operating for an extended period undetected in the Russian bastions.
- A streamlined, upgraded Russian force will be the foundation of a significant threat to the United States. Russia will have discarded its least capable and most expensive assets, while retaining its best. Hence, the US must invest in intelligence indications and warning capabilities to ensure adequate forewarning to allow timely reconstitution of US forces.

Russia will continue to be a viable nuclear threat to the United States. In fact, the Russian SSBN force will be qualitatively better in the year 2000. It is upon this foundation that Russia will be propelled into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The drastic changes occurring within the former Soviet Union are causing many transformations within the Soviet military. The least affected of the military communities should be the operational submarine force. Although the size and makeup of the entire Russian



submarine force will be altered, the reductions will come from deteriorating and obsolete units. The remaining force will be much newer and extremely capable, but the lack of operational deployments and training will likely cause a reduction in capabilities. The U.S. Navy will not face a threat of the type that has caused apprehension during the past forty-five years, but the threat from the newer Russian submarines will present a force that the U.S. Navy must counter by maintaining a credible ASW capability. Abandonment of ASW as a priority in U.S. Navy planning will become a force multiplier for the Russian submarine force in the future.

1. Chernavin, V. "Time and the Fleet: The Navy. Problems of Reduction and Development." (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 54-60.) p.56.

2. "Navy Missile Arsenal to be 'Radically' Reduced." (FBIS-SOV-92-082, 28 APR 1992, p. 3)

3. Unlike other components of the CIS' armed forces, the question of national allegiance will be a non-issue in regards to SSBN's: all of the ballistic missile units are homeported in Russia.

4. "For the Record." (FBIS-SOV-92-055, 20 Mar 1992, p. 5.)

5. Ibid.

6. Chernavin, V. "Time and the Fleet: The Navy. Problems of Reduction and Development." (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 55.)

7. Moscow News Roundtable Discussion. "Ocean. Russia. Navy." (JPRS-UMA-92-005, 12 February 1992, pp. 38-41.) p.38.

8. Lennox, Duncan. "Soviet Naval Strategic Nuclear Weapons." Jane's Intelligence Review. Dec 1991, p. 551.

9. Lennox, Duncan (ed.). "SS-N-18 'Stingray,'" Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1990.

10. Chernavin, V. "Time and the Fleet: The Navy. Problems of Reduction and Development." (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 54-60.) p. 57.

11. There is one report that the Russians are funding a follow-on to SS-N-20 missile, but there is no indication that this program will bear fruit within this time frame. ["Defense Cutbacks May Prompt Technology Export." FBIS-SOV-92-065, 3 April 1992, p. 15]
12. Lennox, Duncan. "Soviet Naval Strategic Nuclear Weapons." Jane's Intelligence Review. Dec 1991, p. 551.
13. EMT calculations use yields from Reference 5 and the following equation:  
$$\text{EMT} = [(\text{Warhead Nbr}) \times (\text{Warhead Yield (MT)})^{2/3}]$$
14. Lennox, Duncan. "Soviet Naval Strategic Nuclear Weapons." Jane's Intelligence Review. Dec 1991, p. 551.
15. Sorokin, Konstantin E. "Naval Strategy in a Renewing Union." (JPRS-UMA-92-001-L, 16 March 1992, pp. 24-32). p. 29.
16. "Resolution of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities." (FBIS-SOV-92-069, 9 Apr 1992, pp. 36-38) p.38.
17. The cost of manning, equipping, and operating an SSBN makes it highly unlikely that Russia would agree to de-MIRVing the SSBN force to one warhead to one missile.
18. Leary, David A. Optimizing the Post-START US Strategic Nuclear Force Mix. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1990. p. 25.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. "Kokoshin Outlines Future Military Needs." (FBIS-SOV-92-053, 18 Mar 92, pp. 25-28) p. 28.
22. Schmitt, Eric. "Sharp Senate Debate Over Pact Seen." The New York Times. 19 July 1991, p. A7.
23. "Navy Missile Arsenal to be 'Radically' Reduced." (FBIS-SOV-92-082, 28 APR 1992, p. 3)
24. SSKP (single-shot kill probability). The SSKP of the Typhoon and the Delta IV missiles is 200% better than any other Russian SLBM. [Leary, p. 4]
25. "Kola Peninsula Could Be 'Submarine Graveyard.'" (FBIS-SOV-92-007, 10 Jan 1992, p. 21.)

26. Admiral V. Chernavin, "Time and the Fleet: The Navy. Problems of Reduction and Development," Moscow, MORSKOY SBORNIK (in Russian), No. 11, November 91, pp. 3-12. (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 55).
27. Konstantin E. Sorokin, "Naval Strategy in a Renewing Union," Moscow, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA (in Russian), No. 11, November 1991, pp.37-50 (JPRS-UMA-992-001-L, 16 March 1992, p.24).
28. Articles include one written by Admiral Chernavin and the transcripts of a round table discussion by fourteen senior Naval Officers.
29. Yelena Agapova, "Before You Form An Army You Should Know What It Is For, Expert Andrey Kokoshin Believes," Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (in Russian), 17 March 1992, pp. 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-92-053, 18 March 1992, p. 25).
30. V. Chernavin, "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy," Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow), November 1991, (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, 54).
31. Discussion of Soviet (Russian) naval missions is found in: Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, July 1991), 20-30.
32. Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., Rear Admiral, USN, Statement before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 5 February 1992, 16-17.
33. V. Chernavin, "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy," (JPRS, 57).
34. Order-of-battle information derived from: Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 131-132, 135-136, 138-139. The Military Balance 1991-1992 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 38-39. Combat Fleets of the World 1988/1989, (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 585-587.
35. Sheafer, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 20.
36. The author arbitrarily assumes the two oldest Charlie II SSGNs will be decommissioned by 2000.
37. Sheafer, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 16-17.

38. Ibid., 17. Also see: Norman Polmar, "The World's Largest Submarine Yard," Naval Institute Proceedings v. 117/10/1,064 (October 1991): 121-123.

39. Sheafer, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 24.

40. Ibid., 23.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 25.

43. Ibid., 24.

44. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 66.

45. Norman Friedman, "Russia Stages a Fire Sale," Naval Institute Proceedings v. 118/4/1,070 (April 1992): 123.



## V. SURFACE FORCES

### A. OVERVIEW

The surface forces of the former Soviet Union will be significantly reduced by the year 2000. In March 1991, Admiral Feodor I. Novoselov, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Shipbuilding said that "expenditure(s) for shipbuilding had dropped by 9-10 percent in 1990 and by 23 percent in 1991 by comparison with 1989, without taking inflation into account."<sup>1</sup>

In addition, funds allocated for ship maintenance are reported to have been "reduced by 50 percent and research and development appropriations have been cut by 40 percent. The first measure, the decrease in shipbuilding expenditures, will affect the Soviet Navy's ability to update older warships. The second is bound to have a serious impact on the development of the Soviet Navy before the year 2000."<sup>2</sup>

Many of the 218 principal surface combatants are currently in port or coastal waters, and their tactical nuclear weapons are being disabled, removed, and stored. Many of these ships are "poorly maintained, so that the Navy is rapidly deteriorating."<sup>3</sup> For the first time since the 1960's no Soviet naval combatants are deployed in the Mediterranean Sea or Indian Ocean.<sup>4</sup>

Under the assumption that there will be no Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by the year 2000, as stated in chapter two, the fleet will be divided between the individual republics which show an interest in creating their own fleets. As a result, there

will be no CIS navy, and any form of combined operations will require the cooperation of the republic navies and leadership.

In a roundtable discussion on Moscow television, Navy Captain Sergie Kozyrev stated that Russia's national interests are the "world's oceans" and not just its borders.<sup>5</sup> Chief Navigator of the Soviet Navy, Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin in his support of continued use of aircraft carriers for the defense of the seas said "if we wish peace for our country we must maintain military presence in the world oceans."<sup>6</sup>

Another view was expressed by Konstantin Sorokin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He believes it is:

necessary to reject existing quasi-oceanic policy, give preference to a less ambitious one and concentrate defense efforts on a regional level...and relying on the Northern and Pacific 'security zones,' follow a course to preventing war, including at sea.<sup>7</sup>

He is basically saying that Russia should concentrate its efforts on coastal operations while maintaining the ability to go to sea. Andrey Kokoshin, also of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has said:

It is absolutely essential that we have small but efficient general-purpose forces, including a navy, which is needed not only for coastal defense but for the defense of the strictly regulated interests of Russia and its CIS allies.<sup>8</sup>

Sorokin and Kokoshin appear to share one point of view on this matter while Kozyrov and Aleksin share another. Kokoshin's reference to "strictly regulated interests" probably encompasses responses to smuggling, sea and coastal lines of communication and violations of sovereignty of the individual republics. It seems most likely that the Russian navy will become mainly a coastal navy,

operating within to 300 kilometers of the shore, while at the same time still having the capability for limited deployments if necessary. If they were to deploy, the Navy would have to take into consideration that there would be little to no air cover and limited underway replenishment capability.

## **B. DISPOSITION OF THE FLEETS**

While a few republics will possess their own surface naval forces, Russia will remain the dominant naval force of all of the republics due to its economic power to control the military budget.<sup>9</sup> This is possible because Russia currently has the budgetary mechanisms in place. Looking first at each of the current fleets in being, and taking into consideration the political and doctrinal goals of the republics, some conclusions can be drawn about their future.

### **1. The Northern and Pacific Fleets**

The Northern and Pacific Fleets are located in total on Russian soil, and thus they will remain Russian fleets in their entirety. The reductions in force they are sure to suffer will be attributed to the scrapping of ships which are obsolete and selling off of assets which can not be supported by the budget.

Apparently all surface ships and submarines still carrying nuclear weapons are in the Russian controlled Northern and Pacific Fleets, although there is a possibility that nuclear weapons do remain in a few antisubmarine cruisers of the Black Sea Fleet.<sup>10</sup> As Kokoshin outlined future military needs, he expressed the belief

that Russia will need "not only coastal defense naval forces collaborating with aviation and land forces, but some proportion of the strategic missile carriers deployed on combat patrol in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk regions."<sup>11</sup> While the Russians may not have continuous patrols in these areas, they are certain to carry out occasional patrols to defend the homeland from maritime attack. These have traditionally been considered to be the two areas most vulnerable to attack.

The current CIS Pacific Fleet has withdrawn all nuclear-powered submarines from the Vladivostok naval base and has undergone reorganization. According to Captain First Rank Viktor Ryzhkov, the first public relations officer appointed to the Pacific Fleet, "the Pacific Fleet headquarters has been moved ashore and the former flagship, Admiral Senyavin, has been struck from the list. There is now no designated flagship."<sup>12</sup> Paper order of battle for the fleet included 45 large surface combatants (including aircraft carriers Minsk and Novorossiysk), 380 small surface combatants, and various submarines and aircraft. Over 20 warships have been paid off and some scrapped.<sup>13</sup> Due to fuel shortages, less than 12 large surface combatants and 20 Tarantul II/III missile corvettes regularly put to sea.<sup>14</sup>

The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are said by Konstantin Sorokin, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, to play secondary roles to the Northern and Pacific Fleets. He stated that their losses "would be tolerated" and that it would be possible to transition into maintaining solely the Northern and Pacific Fleets.<sup>15</sup>



Sorokin has said that the Baltic and Black Sea assets could reinforce the Northern and Pacific Fleets<sup>16</sup>, however, due to the fact that the Black Sea Fleet is mostly obsolete<sup>17</sup>, it would seem more likely that its assets would be scrapped as a suitable way to meet some budget restrictions. Admiral Kasatanov predicted it would take two to three years to accomplish any transition<sup>18</sup>. It will probably take even longer, perhaps until the year 2000, due to the numerous problems which will be incurred in funding the transitions and the availability of facilities to which the forces can be relocated. Russia will not completely do away with the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, but these fleets will continue to hold secondary status to the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

## **2. The Baltic Fleet**

Russia will not retain possession of the entire Baltic Fleet. Since the Baltic states are now separate entities, they probably will not contend for their "fair share" of the forces currently stationed there. Latvia did recently announce the establishment of its own Navy, which is currently composed of just one vessel, and expressed the "hope to receive the vessels due to us from the former Soviet Navy."<sup>19</sup> This statement did not identify any specific plans regarding this matter, however, and it would not appear from this minor mention that this will become a highly debated issue.

It is worthwhile to consider the U.S. threat posed to the former Soviet Union. From the Russian point of view, by analyzing the threat scenario developed for Pentagon planning in which Russia

invades Lithuania<sup>20</sup>, it may seem plausible that the United States would send six aircraft carrier battle groups into the Baltic Sea in response.

However, it can be more logically envisioned from the U.S. perspective that the carriers (and fewer of them) would be positioned in the Barents Sea as opposed to the Baltic. Thus a Baltic Fleet would not be an appropriate counterforce to such a threat. Instead it would prove more appropriate and effective to utilize Northern Fleet assets to fight off U.S. forces in the Barents Sea. Thus, in view of these arguments, there appears to be no need for offensive naval forces in the Baltic Sea.

Admiral Sheaffer, the Director of Naval Intelligence, believes that the Baltic Fleet will become a training fleet "based mainly in the Kaliningrad Oblast and there will be reduced naval activity in the Northern Fleet as well."<sup>21</sup> In view of the lack of a threat in the Baltic Sea the best use of the naval assets in the area would be to train the Russian fleet.

### **3. The Black Sea Fleet**

The biggest controversy in the CIS today by far is the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet. There have been nearly daily reports of statements made by various Russian and Ukrainian officials concerning this issue. The battle seems to bounce back and forth with no likely solution in sight. Going forward from the assumption that the CIS will disintegrate by the year 2000, it is evident that both Russia and the Ukraine will desire to maintain a fleet of their own in order to check one another.<sup>22</sup>

A major factor in determining who should get what part of the Black Sea Fleet is what each republic sees as the mission of its naval forces. A large part of the debate has been over the division between strategic (nuclear) and non-strategic (non-nuclear) forces. The Ukraine says it wants no part of the strategic forces, that it does not want any of its ships to have nuclear capabilities.<sup>23</sup> The leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry and the Navy have stated that there is no possible way to divide the fleet in this way because the elements of the fleet are interdependent as an operational-strategic formation.<sup>24</sup> This question of the division of strategic and non-strategic forces is, in reality, a tool in the struggle for power between the two republics. It will not be the deciding factor by which the force division will be accomplished.

The Ukraine calls itself a sea power and argues that it requires a navy to defend its borders and coast.<sup>25</sup> This sounds contradictory, but it illustrates that the Ukraine's desire is for a navy that primarily defends its borders, yet also has the capability to deploy, if necessary. This makes more sense after reading the comments of Vladimir Krzhanovskiy, plenipotentiary representative of the Ukraine in Russia. He said in a television interview:

We are concerned about [naval defense] for one reason only, and this is that a goodly quarter of our border line is in the sea, in open waters, and we would like to be protected from this direction. In principle, we do not feel that we have a potential enemy.<sup>26</sup>

Very directly, this supports a coastal defense mission because the fact that the Ukraine envisions no enemy means that it has no

justification for building an offensive force.

Ukraine Navy Commander Rear Admiral Kozhin, in a radio interview, expressed his opinion that the Black Sea Fleet must be divided according to the tasks the forces will be expected to perform. He stated that the three tasks of the Ukrainian navy are to protect the Ukrainian naval forces in an operational zone, to protect the economic zone, and to protect the sea borders against contraband.<sup>27</sup> Again, this supports the requirement for coastal forces only.

No specific mission is envisioned for either the Russian or Ukrainian fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ukraine Minister of Defense, Colonel Morozov, was very clear on his country's position when he said "We have no business there."<sup>28</sup> With the emphasis on the transition to a primarily coastal navy it would be difficult to do much more than deploy to the Mediterranean for short periods, and since there is no perceived threat, it would be pointless to expend valuable resources there for any length of time. This reasoning holds true for both the Ukraine and Russia, although Russia has not publicly commented on this issue.

Reports to date indicate that the Russians have been willing to offer 10 to 20 percent of the Black Sea Fleet assets to the Ukraine, but the Ukraine has demanded from 30 percent in some reports, up to as much as 80 or 90 percent in others<sup>29, 30, 31</sup>. Under the assumption that they will eventually come to an agreement, it is feasible that there could be a compromise by which the Russians will give the Ukrainians 20 percent.



As far as berthing/basing requirements are concerned, Russia would eventually need to build its own base in order to maintain a separation from the Ukrainian forces. There are many bases on Ukrainian territory which both the Russian and Ukrainian Fleets would need for support. The Black Sea Fleet is called

a graphic example of how hard it is to divide up property which has been built up through joint efforts over the many centuries of a unified state's existence.<sup>32</sup>

As for the other republics bordering the Black Sea, neither Moldova nor Azerbaijan have expressed any intentions to establish their own navies on the Black Sea. Georgia will claim part of the fleet to defend its borders, but says it is not one of its immediate concerns.<sup>33</sup>

The First Deputy Minister of Defense said Georgia "plan(s) to acquire just some of the warships stationed at the bases of Poti and Ochamchira" of medium and small tonnage. The minister also added that the three republics dividing the assets of the Black Sea Fleet will have to coordinate joint actions because their ships, and possibly those of Turkey, will routinely enter into each other's territorial waters.<sup>34</sup> This statement displays a lot of foresight and realistic expectations on the part of Georgia. It obviously will not get embroiled in a power play as have Russia and the Ukraine, and will negotiate reasonably for any claims it makes.

A Belarussian People's Deputy "quite officially" said that Belarus "has the right to...seven capital ships (naturally, including aircraft carriers),"<sup>35</sup> but this stand was revised a couple of days later when it was announced that "Belarus is not a marine

power and supports Yeltsin's stand on inclusion of the Black Sea Fleet into CIS strategic forces."<sup>36</sup> It is not clear what Belarus would do with its own fleet, especially the matter of where it would station its forces if it were to have pursued standing up its own navy. With the dissolution of the CIS, Belarus will not play a role in the negotiations among the republics vying for Black Sea Fleet assets.

#### **4. The Caspian Flotilla**

Finally, the Caspian Flotilla will be divided between the republics bordering on the Caspian Sea. While the decision on division has been reached, how the transfer of forces and property will take place is still to be determined.

The Caspian Flotilla will be divided such that 25 percent of the Flotilla will remain in Azerbaijan, 25 percent will go to the CIS Navy, and 50 percent will remain under common command until the signing of a quadripartite agreement between Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.<sup>37</sup> The 25 percent of the Flotilla being transferred to Azerbaijan is the amount due to it even before the signing of the intergovernmental agreement, in accordance with protocol.<sup>38</sup> Since the CIS is not expected to survive, the Flotilla will be divided equally between the four republics. Although Azerbaijan is designated to receive the first 25 percent of the Flotilla, the other republics will probably insist upon an acquiring an equal share.

Armenia has expressed concern over Azerbaijan receiving 25 percent of the Flotilla. According to Valeriy Novikov, spokesman

of the CIS Navy, "no weapons from the Caspian Flotilla have been handed over to Azerbaijan."<sup>39</sup> Novikov was commenting on Armenian concern about the "decision to hand over 25 percent of the Caspian Navy to Azerbaijan when combat activities in Nagorno-Karabakh are going on."<sup>40</sup> This concern should be addressed at future meetings between the four republics.

According to Captain Second Rank Nikolay Shumnyy, in charge of the Caspian Flotilla's activity at the Navy Main Staff, the Caspian Flotilla's effective strength "contains several combined units of harbor policing ships and amphibious warfare ships, which are mainly obsolete but quite combat capable."<sup>41</sup> Until the final arrangements are made it will be difficult to determine which forces each of the interested parties will receive. However, each of the four republics will maintain harbor patrol and amphibious capabilities as their primary missions. It is evident, though, that the negotiations over the future of the Flotilla will not follow the same path as those over the Black Sea Fleet, rather the participants will be reasonable and cooperative.

##### **5. Cam Ranh Bay**

The forward naval base in Cam Ranh Bay will definitely be closed down. Currently there is a reduced Russian presence there of solely support forces totalling 17 vessels. This support will end due to Viet Nam's request for 400 million dollars annually in rent which Russia can not afford to pay, and due to the realization that minimal out of area presence would no longer be required in that location.<sup>42</sup>

### C. CONSTRUCTION/SALES/SCRAPPING

There are unmistakable signs of the reduction in Russian naval programs, and of the application of "the policy of *konvertsiya* (conversion) to naval shipbuilding facilities."<sup>43</sup>

NAVICON [Navy Conversion] Holding Group is a joint venture that was set up between the Soviet Union and the Nikreis Group:

as the commercial organization for the Navy of the USSR to convert Navy controlled assets into non-military industrial concerns and a construction industry first for the Navy and secondly for the Russian republic as a whole to enable able bodied seamen to be trained in a commercial career to prepare for their discharge from service and to create a trained and commercially viable construction for Russia.<sup>44</sup>

On 5 December 1991 the Nikreis Group sent a memorandum to the U.S. Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, which was later retransmitted to the Naval Intelligence Command, which listed the naval forces to be scrapped in each fleet. The list of ships planned for scrap included cruisers, guided missile cruisers, destroyers, anti-submarine vessels and patrol craft.<sup>45</sup>

All cruisers, including the Kiev (Northern Fleet), Minsk (Pacific Fleet), and Novorossiysk (Pacific Fleet) have been in use for 12 years and are in need of "urgent" repairs.<sup>46</sup> For this reason they will most likely be scrapped. The only classes of smaller ships which will survive and continue in production are the Udaloy and Sovremennyy.

Admiral Chernavin noted that shipbuilding in classes other than the Kuznetsov is toward small ships with displacements of 2,000-4,000 tons and surface craft that are used for coastal operations.



The production of large ASW and large assault ships and guided missile cruisers is not planned, but the minesweeper forces will be upgraded.<sup>47</sup> While production of large assault ships is not planned, production of smaller assault ships will continue solely to maintain current force levels.

Although the Russians are scrapping many naval vessels, they are offering other submarines and surface ships for sale. Meanwhile, shipyard officials are seeking out foreign commercial contracts for hulls that will take up shipway space previously occupied by naval vessels.<sup>48</sup> These shipyards may require conversion if merchant ships are built where naval vessels were previously built. This conversion of military shipyards to other products will be time-consuming, will probably require fewer skilled workers, and will destroy the potential for a long-term rebuilding of naval forces.<sup>49</sup> Some shipyard conversion has already taken place.

The Baltic Shipyard has transferred its efforts from building naval vessels to building mercantile bulk carriers, while Kommuna 61 (Nikolayev Northern) Shipyard in the Black Sea has not laid any naval keels since the last Slava class was launched in 1989. The Admiralty Shipyard in Leningrad will also cease production following the completion of the last of the Victor IIIs.<sup>50</sup>

The aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was completed and transferred to the Northern Fleet where it had been intended to be stationed from inception as the fleet flagship. She is not expected to deploy outside the area of operations of the Northern Fleet.<sup>51</sup>

The construction of the other two aircraft carriers in the

Ukrainian shipyard at Nikolayev was halted due to a decision made by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry to complete construction of only those ships which are currently at more than 50 percent completion in the shipyards at Nikolayev and Kherson.<sup>52</sup> The carrier Ulyanovsk has already been cut up for scrap<sup>53</sup> and the work on the Varyag awaits a decision on the ships future<sup>54, 55, 56</sup>. It is foreseen that the Varyag will be completed and stationed in the Pacific Fleet as had originally been intended. This will place one aircraft carrier each in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, providing equal capabilities where the majority of the Russian naval assets are stationed.

Admiral Chernavin, in the aforementioned article, argues for production of the aircraft carrier for reason of its combat effectiveness and the decrease in the loss of forces encountered in battle.<sup>57</sup> However, this argument does not stand up to the reality that the carrier is too expensive to be supported in construction under the current budget constraints, and that it does not play into the theory of defensive defense.

Some military hardware has been sold to other countries. For example, one media report made reference to the assets of the Black Sea Fleet already being sold off.<sup>58</sup> The report stated that sales lists for 49 vessels had been prepared by Nevikon-Zyuyd, a joint-stock company (the same company referred to earlier as NAVICON). Specifically, the report stated that the cruiser Zhdanov had been sold to India, the guided missile ship Neulovimiy to Italy, and four patrol boats to Turkey. Plans are to sell 13 more vessels in 1992,

including coastal craft, minesweepers, missile patrol boats, amphibious assault craft, and the destroyer Sveduschiy.

A later report intended to clarify the situation indicated that these sales had been planned prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth.<sup>59</sup> The report also said that several dozen more sales were already planned, as arranged by a 1991 directive. These will be obsolete ships and ships from the auxiliary fleet which include the cruiser Leningrad and four surface ships.

#### D. SUMMARY

The CIS Navy will be unevenly divided among the republics by 2000, with Russia retaining the majority of the forces. The reduction and division of the navy of the former Soviet Union will affect U. S. policy and programming. While the threat of the former Soviet Union seems to have diminished, U.S. policymakers must consider the hardware capability that still exists. Policymakers must also consider other regions of the world and the ability to respond to conflicts worldwide, as they consider cutbacks in U. S. military expenditures. The Northern and Pacific Fleets, while being reduced, will be the major fleets for Russia. The navy there will be mostly coastal, capable of deploying for short patrols. While the U. S. will still deploy to and conduct exercises in the Northern Sea and Pacific Ocean, this activity will most likely be reduced or shortened in view of the Russian force reductions in these areas.

The ships remaining in the Baltic Fleet will be used primarily

for training by Russia. If Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have any fleet at all, they will consist mostly of small patrol boats for coastal defense. The U. S. may reduce exercises in the North Sea as a result of the outcome of the Baltic Fleet being reduced to a training fleet.

The Black Sea Fleet will be greatly reduced from what it is today. It will be divided between Russia and the Ukraine primarily, with Georgia getting a small share. Once naval assets are divided here they will be used primarily for coastal defense. The limited number of ships in the Black Sea Fleet will not seriously affect U. S. deployments to the Mediterranean Sea. The U. S. will continue deployments to the Mediterranean in light of other U. S. interests in the area, despite the probability that Russian and Ukrainian forces will not deploy to the Mediterranean.

The Caspian Flotilla will eventually be equally divided between Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. These assets will be used for harbor patrol and amphibious operations. The Caspian Flotilla is of no importance to U. S. policymakers.

The former Soviet Union will pull out of Cam Ranh Bay since this once strategic facility is no longer required. This action will affect the U. S. in that Russia will not have this base as a forward base for their BEAR-D/F aircraft and naval forces, once a visible Soviet presence to U. S. forces in the South China Sea. The U. S. may also have the opportunity to use this American-built base once again.



Reduction in naval shipbuilding will continue, as Russia and other republics convert their shipyards from naval to commercial production. Merchant ships will be built both for Russia's own use and for sale to other countries. If reconstitution of naval ship building capabilities is necessary in the future, this conversion will make reconstitution more difficult and time-consuming. It is possible that the nuclear weapons being removed from ships in the Black Sea Fleet are being stored locally versus being transferred to Russia. This would make reconstitution easier and faster in the event that there is a perceived exterior threat to the republics. Ships and submarines are also being offered for sale to other countries or are being scrapped, mostly for financial reasons. The U. S. will have to monitor sales of former Soviet hardware to other countries and will need to watch arms transfers as well. In both cases the U. S. must be aware of which third world countries are buying what hardware, and possibly even the training provided with it, in order to be prepared for any conflict.

By 2000, Russia will evolve from the CIS as the dominant naval force. It will remain a powerful naval force, even though it will have a much reduced capability.

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## **VI. NAVAL AVIATION**

### **A. OVERVIEW**

This chapter will attempt to accurately evaluate the posture of former Soviet Naval Aviation as it will exist in the year 2000. In addition to the assumptions stated in the introduction, several assumptions specific to aviation will be stated throughout the body of this chapter. Several assumptions were made necessary primarily for two reasons. The first is that there was not a great deal of literature concerning naval aviation. The second is the fact that it is doubtful that the former republics are sure of what their wants and needs are going to be or what types of forces they will be able to maintain.

A number of topics will be discussed in the body of this chapter: mission/threat as viewed by the former republics, primarily Russia; disposition of forces; estimation of the aviation order-of-battle (AOB); status of the conventional takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) carrier program; status of aircraft production; evaluation of reconstitution capability; defense agreements; and impacts on U.S. policy.

### **B. BODY**

Russia, too, realizes that the Cold War is over and that the probability of aggression against Russia or other republics involving not just nuclear weapons but also the large-scale use of conventional forces will be extremely unlikely.<sup>1</sup> However, Russia

also realizes that numerous regional military conflicts and clashes will arise and there will be no guarantee that these local conflicts and clashes will not lead to "global consequences hazardous to all mankind."<sup>2</sup> Although Chernavin states that the chief mission of the navy will be to "avert the unleashing of war...",<sup>3</sup> the navy will also be tasked with the preservation of the state and the defense of national power.<sup>4</sup> It is assumed that naval missions will change very little from those stated by Chernavin:

The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to start and wage military operations.<sup>5</sup>

Of particular interest for naval aviation, it will be assumed that Russian:

general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective performance of defensive operations in the continental theaters of military operations in conjunction with other branches of the armed forces.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, land-based naval aviation will retain as primary missions the traditional ones of reconnaissance and surveillance, antiship strike, ASW, and aviation support,<sup>7</sup> with antiship strike constituting the core capability as a result of the above assumption. In addition, as a result of naval aviation maintaining a fighter escort capability, it will have coastal defense and intercept as a secondary mission; Air Force units operating under the OPCON of the Military District (MD) commanders will have coastal

defense and intercept as a primary mission.

Although Russia and the other republics will face numerous regional threats from their neighbors and amongst themselves, Russia will continue to view the U.S. as its only major potential adversary; even though U.S. intentions will have changed, U.S. capability will remain high. It is believed that while the quantity of U.S. forces will decrease, the quality will continue to increase and U.S. forces will be even more capable in the future.<sup>8</sup>

With respect to disposition, Russia will retain almost all naval aviation and will continue to maintain forces in all four fleet areas, albeit the presence in the Baltic and Black Sea areas will be diminished. The number of aircraft across the board will have decreased with those remaining being of the highest capability and quality available.

With respect to the Russian republic, the Aviation of Air Defense (APVO) will have been absorbed by the Air Force. All fighter aircraft with the exception of those assigned to naval aviation will be assigned to the Air Force. It will be responsible for defense against all airborne and space-based threats; thus, primary missions will include coastal defense, intercept, and air superiority. The Air Force will also be responsible for long-range and short-range strike against land targets and close air support (CAS) of ground forces.

Russia will form three Military Districts (MDs), Western, Siberian, and Eastern, which will function very much like U.S. unified and specified commands. The Air Force CINC will be similar



to a U.S. type commander in that he will be responsible for allocating assets to the MD CINCs. The Air Force allocated assets will have respective commanders who report to the MD CINC with respect to operational matters and the Air Force CINC with respect to administrative matters. The MD CINCs will be responsible for and have operational control of everything in their respective districts with the exception of land-based naval aviation. Close coordination will exist between the Fleet CINCs, who will have OPCON of naval aviation, and the MD CINCs. There will also be an overall Navy CINC who will be on a par with the Air Force CINC. They will have authority to shift assets between MDs and Fleets as operational necessity dictates.

The continued support for the CTOL carrier program is not surprising. In a thesis written by Stanley G. Stefansky in 1985, he concluded that:

The Politburo has come to accept the role of attack aircraft carriers in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in the developing world. The aircraft carrier complements well their apparent acceptance of a greater military role in Third World crises. The Soviets realize that the attack aircraft carrier provides certain military advantages not apparent in other forms of weaponry. They perceive in aircraft carriers a means of projecting Soviet airpower to distant areas of the world where access to land-based airfields is not guaranteed. It is also a means of protecting naval assets at sea and of competing for 'air supremacy,' a critical prerequisite for gaining sea control in theaters of operations areas far removed from friendly fighter bases.

The local war mission will not be the aircraft carrier's only role in the overall Soviet military doctrine. The Soviets appreciate the mission flexibility of this type of ship and it will surely be tasked to perform many missions of which defense of the homeland is primary. However, the local war mission appears to be extremely important and probably provided one of the major rationales for the decision to build it.<sup>9</sup>

Although his thesis was written with the communist regime in mind,

the rationale that justified its building then continues to exist and will continue to exist. The argument for justification of a CTOL carrier, from the Russian point of view, can be made much stronger today in view of the fact that the threat of nuclear war has greatly diminished and as a result the threat of losing a carrier during time of crisis has greatly diminished. This, in essence, would make the now less vulnerable, multipurpose CTOL carrier a much more cost effective platform and lucrative prospect.

Russia and Ukraine will be the only two republics to retain any significant AOB, with Russia retaining all significant naval aviation. As stated in the introduction Ukraine is to receive 20 percent of the Black Sea Fleet; however, it is assumed that Ukraine will elect to retain a negligible percentage of Black Sea Fleet aviation. With respect to the existing bomber and fighter/FGA aircraft of naval aviation, it is assumed only the TU-22/-22M, SU-24, SU-25, and MIG-23 will be retained. All TU-16 bomber, SU-17, YAK-38, and MIG-27 aircraft will be sold, scrapped, or, if retained, reduced to such a poor material condition of readiness as to be useless.

Based on the above assumption, the Northern Fleet will retain 95 TU-22/-22Ms, 10 SU-25s, and 10 MIG-23s; the Baltic Fleet will retain 20 TU-22/-22Ms and 100 SU-24s; the Black Sea Fleet will retain 66 TU-22/-22Ms; and the Pacific Fleet will retain 60 TU-22/-22Ms and 10 SU-24s.<sup>10</sup> The total number of bomber/strike and fighter/FGA for the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, as estimated above, would be 301 aircraft. This is roughly 25 percent

less than the number envisioned by Chernavin:

As for aviation, we are realizing the decision to restrict the strike and fighter aviation of shore-based naval units in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets to an overall level of 400 combat aircraft, which signifies a reduction of 60 percent.<sup>11</sup>

It is assumed that naval aviation will acquire an undetermined number of Flankers to escort the Backfires and Fencers.

Yeltsin has declared that production of the TU-160 Blackjack will stop at a level equivalent to the B1-B and that production of the TU-142 Bear will stop altogether.<sup>12</sup> However, even though the YAK-141 Freestyle STOV/L, MIG-29K naval Fulcrum, MIG-31M Improved Foxhound, and the SU-25T all-weather attack aircraft programs have been cut, four other programs have been preserved. "These include two next-generation fighters, a major upgrade to the SU-27 Flanker, and a jet trainer to replace the L-39."<sup>13</sup> The SU-27K naval Flanker is currently still in production. The improved Flanker, SU-27M with new fire-control radar and avionics, is scheduled to deploy sometime after 1995. The next-generation fighters, termed the Fulcrum 2000 (MRF--Multi-Role Fighter) and the Flanker 2000 (LRMRF--Long Range Multi-Role Fighter), have been estimated to enter service sometime between 1996 and 2005.<sup>14</sup> The emphasis on going ahead with the new fighter programs is that they will hopefully provide a source of hard currency, as advanced fighters have done in the past.

The ability to reconstitute air assets will be virtually nonexistent. Front-line aircraft will be limited in numbers and those in storage will be in such a poor material condition of readiness as to make them useless. Additional hardware would have to be produced which would put a severe strain on an already weak



economy. A critical, but often overlooked, area will be the shortage of trained pilots and an inability to train additional pilots quickly.

Even though the smaller republics will remain very cautious and wary with respect to Russian power and their perceived threat of Russian imperialism, defense agreements of various flavors will exist between them and Russia. It is assumed that Russia will sign military support agreements with those republics which do not form their own armed forces, particularly the weaker Asian republics. Agreements, treaties, and alliances of a more intricate and complicated nature will evolve between Russia and the republics which form their own armed forces and possibly between Russia and some of the former Warsaw Pact nations. Of primary importance will be agreements concerning the sharing and cooperation of airborne early warning information. Others will likely concern basing agreements, logistics support, spare parts, mutual support, and pilot training.

### C. SUMMARY

As Chernavin has stated, the long run missions of the Russian Navy and thus naval aviation will not change. Naval aviation will maintain forces in all four fleet areas; actual numbers of aircraft will be reduced with the highest quality aircraft being retained. Two CTOL carriers will be operational but the airwings will still be developing. Their primary missions will include fleet air defense, power projection, and defense of the homeland. The APVO



will be absorbed by the Air Force which will be responsible for coastal defense and air intercept. Although defense spending will be considerably reduced, emphasis will be placed on the quality of advanced technology aircraft and air-delivered weapons, not the quantity.

Implications regarding U.S. policy will include the following:

- although reconstitution capability has been deemed low, the U.S. must not underestimate the ability and will of the Russian people in the event of a crisis with Russia.
- even though pilot skill and training will likely be low, third world nations will be able to obtain advanced aircraft, particularly fighters.

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## VII. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFANTRY

### A. OVERVIEW

This chapter will give a description and explanation of the reform process that is ongoing within the General Purpose Forces (GPF) and its direct impact on the Russian Naval Infantry (RNI). Next, a short background and summary of the RNI will be given along with their missions and strategic value. Lastly, an attempt will be made to describe the structure and order of battle of the RNI in the year 2000 and the implications to U.S. national security policy.

### B. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

As stated above by the year 2000 the total personnel of the Russian Armed forces will probably stand at close to 1.5 million.<sup>1</sup> The ground forces then will most likely still occupy the largest percentage of the force though not in such a strong degree as in the past and probably stand at approximately 720,000.<sup>2</sup> The existing Russian GPF will be professional, structured around a defensive doctrine that emphasizes high mobility and high operational readiness, and most importantly equipped with the some of the most modern conventional equipment.

The changes taking place in the GPF will have a direct impact on all parts of the armed forces mainly because of the historical seniority of the GPF. The GPF more than any other branch of the Russian armed forces, are being affected by the most drastic reform since the 1917 revolution. Just one example of the many important vast changes taking place is the restructuring of the military

district system, which will result in there being only three streamlined military districts within Russia where there used to be 16 in the former Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

The military reform of the GPF is predicted to go through several phases with the transitional phase lasting two to three years and by the year 2000 all changes should be firmly established.<sup>4</sup> The reform process is being influenced by several factors with the major ones being the socio-economic situation, the impact of the Gulf war, the CFE treaty, and most importantly day to day politics.

#### 1. GPF POLITICS

The historic monopoly that the GPF had on the General Staff has most likely come to an end based on two important events. The first was the decision by President Yeltsin to appoint Air Marshall Shaposhnikov as head of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which coincidentally is slowly being transformed into the Armed Forces of Russia. The appointment of an Air Force officer to head the Armed Forces was a first in the history of Russia. This was a political-military decision that can be attributed to the loyalty of Shaposhnikov to democratic reform which was demonstrated by his actions during the coup. Additionally, it appears that the political-military leadership is holding air assets in higher esteem in view of the post Gulf war analysis.



The Gulf war was viewed by many senior military members as a "revolution of military affairs" and gave credibility to the predictions of General Ogarkov concerning the "Military-Scientific Revolution." The lessons learned from the Gulf war have fueled this debate between ground and air superiority. The ongoing debate in the Russian military hierarchy will most likely be won in the long run by advocates of air superiority. There appears to be general consensus that the coalition air forces and advanced conventional munitions were at a minimum the critical force responsible for the quick and decisive victory. This, in addition to the appointment of General Grachev, an airborne/light infantry officer, to First Deputy Defense Minister will translate to a lower stature for the ground forces in general and more specifically to the advocates of massed armored forces.<sup>5</sup>

## **2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT**

As stated in chapter II the socio-economic situation in Russia appears to be the key factor in the military reform process. The withdrawal of GPF from the former Warsaw Pact, Mongolia, Cuba, Libya, and other areas around the globe is a number one priority for not only the Russians but for some of the host countries, such as is the case with the Baltic Republics. The problem here is the already strained logistical resources in Russia are not capable of removing these forces or providing them decent living conditions when they do return. Moreover, recalling the GPF is more complicated than air and naval assets, since these forces will have to transit across what is quickly becoming unfriendly if not hostile

areas. This recall of GPF troops is a paradox since the government of Russia desperately wants to gather all of the personnel and equipment of the GPF, yet they do not currently have the resources to support the move.<sup>6</sup> This inability to immediately recall all of the GPF, especially in the Groups of Forces Germany, is being driven by the socio-economic conditions in Russia. Keeping the military content in the near future is definitely a high priority of the Russian government.

A very prevalent theme in the Russian government is the necessity to provide for the social concerns of current and former military members. The Russian government's considerations over these social concerns are based on respect and stature of the GPF but most importantly the current leadership clearly understands that the GPF prevented the success of the coup and have been surprisingly passive in the momentous events that have taken place over the last three years. It is therefore valid to assume that reducing the military in the transitional stage is as dependent on the socio-economic forces as any perceived military threat.

### **3. Other Military/Para-military Forces**

In addition to the Russian military, which will eventually include the Strategic forces, there will exist at least one other notable military force. The MVD (Ministry Troops of Internal Affairs), which has been disbanded, will most likely re-appear as a national guard/internal security force that probably will not exceed 100,000 men. This force will be equipped with armored personnel vehicles and helicopters but will not have heavy artillery

or main battle tanks. Another military force that could appear in the near future, though it is highly unlikely, would be that of a Republic peace-keeping force under the command of the CIS and constituted from volunteer forces of various republics.<sup>7</sup> The Russian national guard will appear but the peace-keeping forces of volunteers are probably never going to come to fruition, at least under the command of the CIS. Neither of these forces will carry much combat power, and therefore possess no strategic value.

### C. BACKGROUND OF THE RNI

Tsar Peter the Great established the first Russian naval infantry regiment in 1705. It was utilized in the Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774, in Greece in 1799, and in the war against Napoleon in 1812. After this war the RNI was done away with and only token naval infantry units were employed in subsequent conflicts. The RNI reappeared late in World War I, but this time with a new look. Organic support to include artillery, machine guns, and signal units were now present. The RNI was used in WWI, the October Revolution of 1917, and during the Civil War of 1919-1922. Once the Civil War was over, the RNI was again disbanded and would not be reestablished again until 1939. In 1940 a decision was made to form sailors into a unit for use ashore. The 1st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade was at the time of the invasion the only marine unit in the Russian armed forces. After the RNI's impressive record in the Great Patriotic War, they were once again disbanded in 1947, when conventional forces in all of the super powers became unpopular.<sup>8</sup>

The marines came into their own as a branch in 1960, when they were greatly expanded. In the early 1980's they were reorganized once again when the Coastal Defense Force (CDF) was restored by the Soviet Navy and absorbed two former branches, the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) and the Coastal Missile Artillery Force (CMAF). This reorganization of the Navy's land-based coastal defense force was probably initiated as a result of Soviet force reductions and their declared defensive doctrine. Since at least 1986, a distinct trend in Soviet military writings indicates that a re-examination of coastal defense concepts has been underway. This scrutiny will no doubt intensify during the restructuring phase in the near future. One Soviet source has stated that the Coastal Force is a revival of the old Coastal Defense Service that was a major branch of the Navy from 1926 until its abolition in the early 1960's.<sup>9</sup>

In 1990 three Motorized Rifle Divisions were transferred to the Soviet Navy in an attempt to exempt their equipment from the Conventional Force in Europe treaty (CFE). Currently each western fleet's land-based coastal defense force now combines a former motorized rifle division, renamed a coastal defense division (CDD), Naval Infantry, and a Coastal Missile Artillery Force. The same structure had previously existed within the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

#### **1. Missions**

Russian marines are a part of the navy and are an elite force with a high esprit de corps that is based in large part on their valorous past. Marines are likened to motorized riflemen.



They belong however, to the naval forces and have not only the weapons of the motorized riflemen but special weapons and skills, such as rockets and amphibious vehicles, and they are trained for amphibious warfare. Although they have extensive training in riverine crossings and in the defense of naval bases, their main mission is to act as the initial assault force. They are plainly intended to "hit the beaches" and securing objectives on enemy coasts first opening the way for the larger follow-on forces of the GPF. Marines can work in close cooperation with both ground and air forces.

As stated above, although the RNI is under the control of the CDF its primary mission and training emphasis has not been restricted to defense of the coast but rather toward amphibious assaults/landings. This is a military operation of the RNI that has both tactical and strategic significance especially since the transfer of the MRDs to the Western Fleets. The amphibious landing is conducted in close cooperation with ground and air forces according to a common plan. The primary goal of an amphibious landing is to capture and occupy enemy territory from the sea and the air. Additionally, sea landings can serve to support operations of the ground forces taking place in the direction of the coast. Finally, sea landings can serve to establish new bases of operation for the fleet by capturing ports, islands, or important island groups.

## **2. Current Disposition of the RNI**

The RNI is under the administrative control of the CDF as

is the CMAF and the newly transferred CDDs. The Pacific Ocean Fleet Coastal Defense Force (CDF) consists of a 6,000-man naval infantry division, which is the largest contingent in the 4 fleets, and 8,500-man CDD, and a CMAF.

The Northern Fleet CDF consists of two naval infantry brigades (one cadre strength), a CDD, and a CMAF.

The Baltic Fleet CDF consists of a naval infantry brigade, a CDD, a CMAF, and two naval artillery brigades.

The Black Sea Fleet CDF consists of a naval infantry brigade, a CDD, a CMAF, and one naval artillery brigade. (The future of the Naval Infantry of the Black Sea Fleet is currently cloudy. Most likely Ukraine will attempt to retain the majority of these assets since they are technically part of the Coastal Defense Forces, and coastal defense is a legitimate justification for the Ukraine in its military doctrine. The problem arises for the Ukraine in logistically supporting this force. Not only is it expensive to man equip and train these elite troops, but the industrial base that supports the spare parts for the majority of the TLE is located in Russia).<sup>10</sup>

The total strength of the Soviet Naval Infantry with the recently transferred MRDs should not exceed 70,000 men including the higher staffs and support troops as well as the training elements. The existence of these troops is significant, especially in view of the deployment of amphibious ships such as the Ivan Rogov and the emphasis that was in the Soviet writings on the external role of the Soviet Armed Forces.<sup>11</sup> The presence of the MRDs in a coastal

defense role would not exclude their availability for amphibious warfare operations since the majority of their equipment is compatible with amphibious warfare ships.

The heaviest concentration of marines was in the Baltic area where the two brigades were the strongest. The marine infantry brigades are of varying strengths. Strong brigades have up to four regiments while the weaker ones have only two. Other brigades may be structured similar to the motorized rifle regiment.

### **3. Organization of the RNI**

The organization of a marine infantry regiment is similar to that of a motorized rifle regiment in a MRD and is a combined arms fighting force. The organization of a regiment clearly shows its vast capabilities:<sup>12</sup>

- Regimental headquarters and staff platoon,
- Reconnaissance company,
- Engineer company,
- NBC defense platoon,
- Supply company,
- Tank battalion with a headquarters, staff and supply platoon, and three companies (each with 10 PT-76's),
- Three marine infantry battalions with a headquarters, staff and supply platoon, three marine infantry companies (each with seven armored personnel carriers), a mortar platoon (three 82mm mortars) and a recoilless rifle platoon (three 82mm antitank guns).

#### **4. Primary Equipment**

The Marines are equipped with the amphibious reconnaissance/scout tank PT-76 and the BTR-60PB armored personnel carrier, while the newly transferred MRDs are mostly equipped with T-72 and T-80 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers. Some of these armored vehicles of the MRDs were not designed for amphibious operations and therefore have limited use for such operations.

#### **5. Support Equipment**

The merchant marine fleet of the former Soviet Union was key to the deployment of the naval infantry and other ground forces. The fleet has 110 commercial roll on/roll off (RO/RO) ships making it possible for tanks and other military vehicles to be loaded and transported to foreign nations without detection by national means of inspection (i.e., satellite surveillance). Additional RO/RO ships, all of which can serve as military sealift or logistics ships, are on order.<sup>13</sup> These additional ships will probably be completed since they also hold important civilian use, but their availability in the future for combat operations is not as secure as in the past when the civilian industry of the past would immediately heed to orders from Moscow.

The RNI have approximately 80 amphibious ships of different classes that are barely enough to carry the assigned seamen and equipment. As stated in Chapter V, these amphibious classes of ships will probably not continue to be manufactured in the near future. Nevertheless, these remaining ships will probably be maintained in order to support the critical RNI mission, while the



ROROs can be used for the CDD's once a beachhead or port is established. Additionally, the former Soviet Union was the largest operator of military air cushion vehicles. These vehicles are extremely valuable in that they provide a high-speed across-the-beach assault capability which reduces the vulnerability of troops. They are also well suited for shallow or ice covered waters as are found in the Baltic.<sup>14</sup>

#### D. IMPACT OF CFE/RECONSTITUTION

The CFE can turn into a major altercation between several of the Republics in the very near future. All of the affected former Republics have made public statements to the effect that they support ratification of the treaty in their legislative bodies. The problem though, is that the former republics have also made statements declaring the formation of their respective armies and with the stated size of these armies the combination of the numbers of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) would be in violation of the CFE.<sup>15</sup> This altercation could play out in several ways, the most likely being that the armies of the Republics will be reduced to levels that will not violate the TLE requirement. In the short run, however, Ukraine and Byelarus have been making statements suggesting that Russia absorb the majority of the reductions of TLE.

Another CFE related issue was that during the negotiations the former USSR transferred three MRDs to the CDF in an attempt to exempt them from the TLE provisions and to bring naval arms control into the treaty. This move in effect assigned more tanks to the

Soviet Navy than the total tanks in the British army.<sup>16</sup> This issue was later worked out by the all the signatories agreeing that all TLE in the Atlantic To The Urals (ATTU) should be counted whether it was part of land based naval forces or not. The end result was a much strengthened CDF that now plays in the strategic analysis.

#### **E. RNI IN THE YEAR 2000**

By the year 2000 the whole Russian military, to include the GPF and RNI will have completed the transition under the military reform program. During the transitional period, though, the GPF and RNI will be degraded considerably, probably only being able to provide regional security and defense missions. This decline in military capability will be short lived.

When the GPF does complete the reform process the CDF, CDD, CMAF, and specifically the RNI will definitely resemble the "meaner and leaner" concept and will truly regain the elite stature that they held earlier in the century. This will be accomplished by the downsizing of personnel and equipment in other parts of the GPF with their eventual transfer to the CDF. The transfer of new combat equipment and personnel will at a minimum replace other assets and at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat potential of this force. The logic for the equipment transfer will be based on continuing to make a point on including naval arms control in future CFE-1A negotiations and the defensive-defense doctrine needed by Russia now more than ever in the new geo-strategic environment of eurasia. The military will have a mostly professional force, that is highly

trained, very mobile, highly motivated and equipped with modern conventional arms.<sup>17</sup>

The concept of operations of the RNI will in general remain the same, but will probably attempt to incorporate much more combined arms integration, and defense training aimed against enemies with advanced conventional munitions. Furthermore, the GPF and RNI will with much difficulty strive to develop their own equipment in line with the "military-technical revolution."

Although research and development for ground forces will be cut drastically we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems already developed, such as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel carrier. The older equipment in the inventory will either be destroyed, sold, or stored east of the Urals in compliance with the CFE treaty. The RNI specifically will be equipped with an improved PT-76, BTR-80 APC's while the CDDs will have the T-80UM, BMP-3s, and advanced anti-tank missiles with all the equipment having thermal night acquisition capabilities.

The reconstitution capability of the GPF will remain high since the vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not deteriorate due to the cold dry climate. Many of the armored vehicles can be easily brought up to working condition by some routine maintenance and battery replacement. Much of this TLE is modern equipment, while the obsolete TLE and excess equipment will be destroyed or sold in the lucrative arms export business for hard currency.

## **F. SUMMARY**

In the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the general trends that can be expected are sizable force reductions, degradation of operational readiness, reduced mobilization potential, and most importantly an inability to conduct large scale offensive operations. In the short run, the U.S. military will not be perceived as a threat to Russia, even though the U.S. is still considered to have an extensive military capability. The key concept to keep in mind for the future is that intentions are very difficult to recognize, while capabilities are not.

In the long run the GPF and RNI specifically will transform into a force that could easily execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO. This is predicated on the assumption of the predicted size of NATO and the U.S. forces in Europe in 1995. The bottom line is that although the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get smaller they will become more lethal.

Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews. Additionally, the GPF, to include the RNI, might be inclined to volunteer their forces for peace-keeping duties, if for no other reason than for minimal training value, deferment of training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the Russian flag. There will probably be an emphasis on low intensity



conflict intervention, in view of the problems arising in the new multi-polar environment.

The RNI will evolve by the year 2000 into a highly elite, well trained combat force that when called upon and supported properly, can be the sharp dagger of Russian hegemony. The GPF, as its history for centuries has proven, will remain the broadsword of the land fighting capability. Only time will tell if the future Russian military will again pose a threat to the security of Europe, but as in any other inter-war period, a wary eye should be constantly looking toward any possible adversary. A famous Greek philosopher once said that the only soldier who knows no more war is the dead one. Regrettably, history has made this a truism.

1. This was also stated by President Yeltsin who envisages an Army which is professional, mobile, unburdened by administrative structures - small, but large enough to defend the country. In this same article the cut of the armed forces is said to be from 2.5 million to 1.5 million or 1.25 million. "Armed Forces Resurrection Linked to Statehood", carried by Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 May 9, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 27).

2. This figure is based on the assumption of 60 divisions with approximately 12,000 personnel per division.

3. Interview with Aleksandr Kotenkov, deputy leader of the Russian president's State-Law Administration, by Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko, "Kontenkov Interviewed on Armed Forces Role," date and place not given: "We Should Create Ministry of Military Reform," Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian April 14, 1992 p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-074, April 16, 1992, pp. 32-34).

4. This transitional period is prevalent in all of the public statements coming out of Russia.

5. General Grachev was quoted as saying that "alongside the traditional branches of service (Rocket and Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy, which it is planned to preserve until 1995) there is a need for mobile forces - a new operational strategic formation of along the lines of the rapid

deployment force. These will include airborne assault combined units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile support services for all arms of service, and will be capable of carrying out their mission in any sector of operations." Reported by Colonel O. Falichev, "Grachev Details Armed Forces Creation 'Concept'," Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 26, 1992, p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, pp. 24-25).

6. In this newscast the text read "RIA today carried a statement by Dmitriy Volkogonov, Russian People's deputy and President Yeltsin's military affairs counselor, in which he said Russia intends to take under its wing all military units that have not yet been taken under the jurisdiction of other republics. Not a single Russian soldier or officer must remain without political and social protection, Dmitry Volkogonov said." From the "Novosti" broadcast carried by the Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT April 8, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-069, April 9, 1992, p. 19).

7. Interview with Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Afanasiyevich Kokoshin by presenter Mishina; from the "Novosti" news cast - live, "Defense Official on Armed Forces Coexistence," carried by Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1100 GMT May 11, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 27).

8. Defense Intelligence Report, The Soviet Naval Infantry, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p.1.

9. Department of Defense, 1991 Military Force in Transition (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 58.

10. Article by Navy Coastal Troops Chief Lieutenant-General I. Shuratov: "Nationalize and ...Disband? What will be the Fate of the Coastal Troops of the Black Sea Fleet?", "Ukraine's Claim on Black Sea Naval Infantry," Krasnaya Zvezda, March 12, 1992, p. 1 (JPRS-UMA-92-012, April 8, 1992, pp. 31-32).

11. Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 177.

12. Department of the Army, FM 100-2-3 THE SOVIET ARMY (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), p. 4-8.

13. Department of Defense, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 103.

14. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 50-51.

15. This problem was supposedly solved at the May 1992 CIS Tashkent Summit, but might still become a problem as reported in the article "General Staff Officer on Division of Weaponry" by Major-General Vadim Grechaninov, chief of the Center for Operational-Strategic Research of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "Divorce Moscow-Style," carried in Kiev Golos Ukrainy in Russian, April 2, 1992, p. 3. (JPRS-UMA-92-014, April 22, 1992, pp. 4-5).

16. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, 1991 ed., s.v. "Conventional Arms Control in Europe," by Jane M.O. Sharp.

17. In an "'Appended' Statement Issued" to the Resolution on Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and also for the fulfillment of Russia's international commitments...the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of delivery...For the prompt neutralization of possible local military conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities," appended to April 1, 1992 resolution, carried by the Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian April 8, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-069, April 9, 1992, pp. 37-38).



## VIII. FINDINGS

- The political situation in the former Soviet Union has called military policy and doctrine into close review.
- Collective security of former Soviet republics has not been agreed to by a sizable number of republics.
- The military policy of the Russian Federation calls for the prevention of war, primacy of defense of the homeland, strengthening of international stability, and an overall defensive framework.
- "Defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" remain the guiding principles of Russian military doctrine.
- Russian military doctrine views no state as an enemy.
- "Reasonable sufficiency" has taken on increased importance due to the economic troubles of the former Soviet Union.
- "Defensive defense" has taken on a more strictly coastal character for the former Soviet Navy.
- High technology, mobility, professionalism, social protection of the troops, and downsizing are the military-technical concepts of Russian military doctrine receiving the most emphasis in open literature.
- Ukrainian military policy and doctrine are defensive in nature and call for defense of the homeland, nuclear free and bloc free status.
- President Yeltsin promised that 60 percent of the new military budget would be used for social issues.
- Procurement levels have been cut by about 80 percent from levels in the same period last year.
- Current military spending appears to be about 4.5 percent of Gross National Product.
- Expenditures for shipbuilding dropped in 1990 and 1991, and funds allocated for ship maintenance and research and development were cut.
- Many of the principal surface combatants are currently in port or coastal waters, and their tactical nuclear weapons are being removed.



- The Pacific Fleet headquarters has moved from the designated afloat flagship to ashore.
- Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia have expressed a desire for part of the Black Sea Fleet.
- Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have laid claim to parts of the Caspian Flotilla.
- The Russian Navy will no longer use Cam Ranh Bay port facilities.
- Russia is selling and scrapping many surface ships, and some shipyards are already being converted for construction of commercial ships.
- The former-Soviet Union ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force will be smaller, more survivable, and more accurate.
- The Russian SSBN order-of-battle will exist as a deterrent force.
- START requirements will slash the number of SSBNs; Typhoons and Delta IVs will be the mainstay of the force.
- There are no SSBNs under construction nor will any be introduced into service during the 1990s.
- Total equivalent megatonnage for the whole SSBN force is 360-411.7.
- SSBNs will continue to patrol in traditional bastion areas.
- Russian general purpose submarines (SSNs, SSs, and SSGNs) will ensure "strategic stability" for the SSBNs by providing an defense in-depth.
- Russian general purpose submarines will undergo a radical numerical reduction; however, construction on newer, more capable units will continue, albeit at a reduced rate.
- Russia is trying and will continue to try to sell advanced fighter aircraft for hard currency.
- The SU-27K, Fulcrum 2000, and Flanker 2000 advanced fighter programs have been preserved.
- The Russian economy will not be able to support the current force structure and, as a result, naval aviation and aviation in general can be expected to make substantial reductions.

- There is no evidence to support that a change in the traditional missions of naval aviation will occur.
- Development continues on CTOL aircraft.
- The Russian Naval Infantry will remain a strong viable force.

## IX. CONCLUSIONS

The former Soviet Union will continue to face severe economic and political problems throughout the 1990s. These problems will determine the direction of the future military policy and doctrine of the Russian Federation. The CIS will not remain the premier security agency in Central Eurasia. Some states will sign collective security agreements, as has already been done, but the Russian state will remain the real military power in the region. The policy and doctrine of Russia will view no state as an enemy, concentrate on downsizing, defense of the homeland, international stability, professionalization, high-tech improvements, and cooperation with international peacekeeping organizations. The relationship between Russia and Ukraine will be strained, but will not evolve into open conflict.

The economic outlook for the former Soviet Union is dismal. Real growth in the economy will be negligible. The military's portion of the budget will be 4.5 percent and will severely impact training. The procurement cycle will be drastically reduced with relatively few new construction units entering the service by 2000. The impact on training will lower the quality of forces, even in those areas where hardware reductions result in qualitatively better forces. The research and development budget decrease will result in an increasing technology gap favoring the U.S.

The Naval leg of the nuclear triad will remain the preeminent force in the Navy. The SSBNs will remain totally under Russian control. The numbers will be decreased both in hulls and missiles,

and the deployments will consist entirely of bastion patrols. Qualitatively the SSBN force will be leaner and meaner.

General purpose submarines will undergo radical reductions. The submarine force will be qualitatively better but will suffer from severe training problems due to lack of underway time.

The surface forces will suffer the same reductions that the other forces have seen and probably to a greater extent than the submarine force. The Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla will be divided and will decrease in importance. The Pacific Ocean Fleet and the Northern Fleet will remain exclusively Russian. Deployment cycles will remain as they are now, at an extremely low level with almost no overseas patrols. This reduction will also make reconstitution of forces more difficult.

Naval aviation will continue its work in all Fleet areas but with greatly reduced numbers. The quality will increase in the hardware as in the other branches, but again training will be the downfall. The carrier program will not be ended but will be greatly reduced. PVO will be absorbed into Strategic Defense Forces.

Russian Naval Infantry will also adhere to the leaner and meaner concept. Concentration will be on high mobility and greater firepower. Some units will be taken over by Ukraine but the vast majority of the CDF, of which the RNI is a part, will remain under Russian control.

Implications for the US are: decreased contact with Russian forces on the high seas; decreased justification for Centurion and Seawolf; greater security for US SSBNs; lowering of possible



confrontations with Russia; increased cooperation on regional and international security issues; and lower defense budgets if justified in any way by the Russian threat.



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